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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, the author presents an analysis of the challenges which confronted 
the United States government and the intelligence community after September 11, 2001 
and examines some of the criticisms of government agency action, specifically the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the years prior to the terrorist attacks on the 
homeland.  The author provides a historical overview of the FBI prior to September 11, 
2001 and then discusses both the transformational challenges and successes encountered 
by the FBI post 9/11 in an effort to create a predictive intelligence capability within the 
agency while maintaining its current statutory responsibilities as the nation’s primary 
federal investigative and law enforcement agency. The thesis examines both military 
transformational processes, as well as the British Model of Domestic Intelligence, and 
provides recommendations relevant to the ongoing and strategic transformational efforts 
by the FBI. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Soon after September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the 
Central Intelligence Agency came under criticism for failing to prevent Al - Qaeda from 
perpetrating terrorist acts against the United States. Commissions were formed, 
investigations ensued, and judgments about the efficacy of these organizations were 
rendered for Americans to read in fascinating and unprecedented detail. Despite the calls 
for a new domestic intelligence agency to respond to the new challenge of transnational 
terrorism, the two major commissions charged with investigating governmental agency 
actions on 9/11 returned recommendations that fell short of such a change.1 
Of the many criticisms and recommendations offered by these commissions, one 
of the most important to the future of the FBI and its role as a domestic intelligence 
agency was provided by the Presidential Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of 
the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. The commission supported 
the FBI’s efforts of organizational reform in tumultuous times but advised that the agency 
could not go it alone—that it must place itself squarely into the intelligence community 
and subject itself “to the coordinating authority” of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI). The commission recommended the FBI place its 
counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and intelligence directorate under one distinct 
service within the bureau, ensuring that it does not “escape effective integration into the 
intelligence community.”2  These recommendations were essential to the renewed faith in  
 
 
                                                 
1 National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “The 9/11 Commission 
Report,” http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (accessed January 6, 2008). 
2 Laurance Silberman and Charles Robb, “The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the 
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Presidential Commission Report, U.S. Coast 




the FBI’s ability to transform, and the swiftness with which the bureau enacted them are a 
testament to the leadership’s understanding of the FBI’s future within the intelligence 
community. 
As stated by the actual commission:  
The FBI is one of the proudest and most independent agencies in the 
United States Government. It is on its way to becoming an effective 
intelligence agency, but it will never arrive if it insists on using only its 
own map. We recommend that you order an organizational reform of the 
Bureau that pulls all of its intelligence capabilities into one place and 
subjects them to the coordinating authority of the DNI [the DNI or 
Director of National Intelligence is also referred to as the ODNI or the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence] - the same authority that 
the DNI exercises over Defense Department intelligence agencies. Under 
this recommendation, the counterterrorism and counterintelligence 
resources of the Bureau would become a single National Security Service 
inside the FBI.  It would of course still be subject to the Attorney 
General's oversight and to current legal rules. The intelligence reform act 
almost accomplishes this task, but at crucial points it retreats into 
ambiguity.  Without leadership from the DNI, the FBI is likely to continue 
escaping effective integration into the Intelligence Community.3   
As a result of these and other commission recommendations, the FBI did create a 
separate branch focusing exclusively on national security matters, bringing together the 
counterterrorism and counterintelligence divisions under the leadership of an executive 
assistant director.    
This effort at reorganization did not stifle criticism and calls for the FBI to be 
stripped of its domestic intelligence function. Much of the literature reviewed for this 
thesis was written either in support of these criticisms or in defense of the FBI as an 
institution that could transform itself into an organization better suited to defend the 
United States against the growing, asymmetric threat of the twenty-first century.   
This thesis explores the literature addressing the domestic intelligence needs of 
the United States, discusses the FBI’s intelligence role, provides information regarding 
transformational change ongoing within other governmental organizations, reviews the 
                                                 




British model of domestic intelligence, and, most importantly, describes the 
transformative process ongoing within the FBI to meet the domestic intelligence 
requirements of the United States. The primary objective of this work is to describe the 
historic changes occurring within the FBI and to determine whether these changes will be 
adequate to meet the intelligence-security needs of the United States.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
One of the most important questions facing the United States intelligence 
community (USIC) is whether or not the FBI can continue to transform itself into an 
organization that retains both its investigative and intelligence functions.  The challenge 
is to create a domestic intelligence and law enforcement agency capable of identifying 
vulnerabilities, threats, and intelligence gaps in order to create a predictive intelligence 
picture for U.S. policymakers. This new agency should then be able to target its organic 
collection assets against these dangers. Finally, if a prosecutorial option exists, and only 
after all intelligence collection opportunities have been exploited, the FBI may still utilize 
its lawful powers to arrest suspects. The critical advantage the FBI possesses over other 
government agencies is that it only needs to obtain Attorney General “Use Authority” to 
use the intelligence it previously collected as evidence in a criminal prosecution. 
The ability to transform intelligence collection into evidence within a single 
agency is contrary to the methods that must be used by the domestic intelligence agencies 
of other nations.  These agencies do not have the power of arrest and must provide the 
fruits of their intelligence collection operations to a separate law enforcement 
organization to conduct an arrest, transform intelligence into evidence, and present the 
case to a government prosecutor(s) for trial.  
This thesis examines the criticism leveled at the FBI since September 11, 2001. It 
will address how the FBI has and is transforming itself to address the domestic 




C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The reasons for the creation of a new intelligence agency are varied, as are the 
ideas about the type of agency that should be created. The primary criticism of the FBI, 
however, is that it is an investigative agency focused on its traditional law enforcement 
responsibilities and less an organization focused on collection and providing intelligence 
to decision makers.  Proponents for a new agency suggest the FBI is a “gun culture” and 
does not adequately perform as a domestic intelligence agency and that it is incapable of 
doing so given its heritage as a traditional law enforcement organization. Others suggest 
the culture of the FBI is so resistant to change that even as it attempts to do so, the agency 
will miss critical indicators of future terrorist attacks.  
Many of the models the proponents of change wish to emulate are those used by 
the British, Canadians, and Australians. These countries have domestic intelligence 
agencies wholly separate from national police forces or the local police departments that 
these agencies must use to pursue prosecutions on the investigations (actually intelligence 
collection operations) they conduct. What makes this process difficult, are the techniques, 
tactics, and procedures that must be safeguarded during the transitory process of taking 
the intelligence investigation conducted by one agency and transferring it to a law 
enforcement organization, whose investigators must then compile, refine, and often times 
exclude some evidence in bringing a case to trial. 
Since there have been no attacks on U.S. soil since those of 9/11, the arguments of 
those suggesting a change is required have been muted, but not silenced. The following 
pages will set forth arguments for and against changes to the current collaborative 
processes in use by the intelligence community today. 
1. Key Assumption / Key Question 
The most common assumptions used by those proposing change is that the current 






have been amassed to suggest this is true in the years following the attacks of September 
11, 2001 and the ensuing changes to the FBI and the intelligence community to which it 
belongs?   
For the proponents of a new domestic intelligence agency, how do they envision it 
operating differently than the Federal Bureau of Investigation?  What legislation would 
need to be passed to allow such investigation to take place? In what ways would a 
prospective U.S. model be similar to the domestic intelligence agencies in Canada, 
Australia, the United Kingdom, or even India? Furthermore, how would the United States 
balance the authorities of this prospective agency with the American public’s concerns 
about the government monitoring their private concerns? Given this country’s traditional 
appreciation for privacy and suspicion that its government spies on citizens without 
predication, the creation of a new domestic intelligence agency having the power to 
conduct investigations without predication seems almost antithetical to the beliefs held by 
the framers of democracy. Most importantly, in what way would the creation of a 
domestic intelligence agency contribute to the cessation of terror within national borders 
and how would such an agency provide “evidence” collected under a lower standard of 
probable cause to a law enforcement agency (presumably the FBI), for use in trial in a 
United States District Court? This thesis hopes to address these and other questions 
related to the future of domestic intelligence. 
2. Literature Proposing a Separate Domestic Intelligence Agency 
Of those advocates leading the charge for a new domestic intelligence agency, 
separated from the FBI, none has been more prolific in his calls for immediate action than 
Judge Richard Posner. Judge Posner is a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit and a senior lecturer in law at the University of Chicago in Illinois. Two 
of his books on the subject, Remaking Domestic Intelligence and Uncertain Shield: The 
U.S. Intelligence System in the Throes of Reform, showcase his belief that the FBI is not 
able to transform itself from an agency steeped in a culture of law enforcement into an 




As such, the FBI is merely able to implement immature and ad hoc programs to counter 
the terrorist threat to the homeland forcing the Department of Defense to engage in 
domestic intelligence gathering as evidenced by the National Security Agency’s Terrorist 
Surveillance Program.4 
Posner’s calls for action have roused a series of online discussions or “blogs” 
dedicated to advancing the conversation on the creation of a new domestic intelligence 
agency.  One such discussion paraphrases and praises Posner’s work and further suggests 
that, based on the FBI’s past abuses under Hoover’s leadership, the agency is no longer 
“adept” at performing the duties of a domestic intelligence agency.5 
Other articles point to the FBI’s inability to transform quickly enough into an 
agency postured to conduct the actions of a domestic intelligence agency. Walter Pincus 
highlights the comments from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
when it the FBI has yet to develop a comprehensive human source manual, which is 
projected to integrate the operations of both criminal and intelligence sources.6   
Acknowledging this shortcoming, Assistant Director Wayne Murphy of the FBI’s 
Directorate of Intelligence testified before congress in July 2007 to disclose the FBI had, 
in fact, written and disseminated a Comprehensive Human Source Policy Manual to the 
field: 
In October 2004, the FBI initiated the FBI’s Confidential Human Source 
Re-engineering Project. Described as the “one-source concept,” its key 
goals were to enhance the consistency, efficiency, and integrity of our 
Confidential Human Source Program across the FBI and better align 
source management with our current mission. 
                                                 
4 Richard Posner, “Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis,” Washington Post, December 21, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/20/AR2005122001053_pf.html (accessed 
January 5, 2008). 
5 Edward Morrissey, “Time To Create a Domestic Intelligence Agency?” Captain's Quarters Blog, 
comment posted on March 19, 2007, http://www.captainsquartersblog.com/mt/archives/009443.php 
(accessed January 5, 2008). 





…Core elements of the re-engineering project included the development 
and deployment of a new policy manual, a disciplined validation process, 
and rigorous training and oversight to ensure compliance with the 
guidelines. The guidance set forth in the “Confidential Human Source 
Policy Manual” and the “Confidential Human Source Validation Manual” 
went into effect in June 2007.  
The “Confidential Human Source Policy Manual” establishes FBI policy 
and procedure for the operation and administration of confidential human 
sources. This manual ensures the FBI fulfills its intelligence collection and 
information dissemination mission in compliance with the Attorney 
General guidelines, requirements, protocols, rules, regulations, and 
memorandums of understanding with various law enforcement and 
intelligence community partners governing the FBI’s Confidential Human 
Source Program.7 
In Posner’s most recent book on the subject, Countering Terrorism: Blurred 
Focus, Halting Steps, he carries over the argument he began in his first book, Remaking 
Domestic Intelligence.  Posner focuses on removing the national security responsibilities 
from the bureau and placing them into a separate agency. Posner contends that the 
attributes that make the FBI so skilled at law enforcement are the reasons that make the 
agency so ill suited to fulfill the role of a domestic intelligence agency.8 
Amy Zegart’s, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 also 
conducts an analytical review of the two agencies.  Her ideas focus on the inability of 
both the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to adapt to the new threats facing 
the nation after the Cold War. Her arguments are persuasive, as is her research. Dr. 
Zegart focuses almost exclusively on the FBI and CIA and, through this narrow lens, 
dissects the agencies’ organizational structure and suggests that reflexive change does not 
necessarily equal structural evolution.9 While there is some truth in this assessment, it 
                                                 
7 Wayne Murphy, “Congressional Testimony Regarding the CHS Program,” Congressional Testimony 
(July 19, 2007), Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress07/murphy071907.htm (accessed December 5, 2008). 
8 Richard A. Posner, Countering Terrorism: Blurred Focus, Halting Steps (Lantham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007). 
9 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 




should not be construed as an absolute that these agencies cannot fulfill their independent 
roles of protecting the homeland without first examining the multitude of changes taking 
place in both agencies to better adapt to the current and future asymmetric threat. 
3. Literature Arguing against a Separate Domestic Intelligence Agency 
On the other side of the intelligence reform debate, a substantial number of former 
intelligence and national security professionals are cautioning the nation’s policymakers 
that it would be unwise to change course and further divide the intelligence collection and 
law enforcement capabilities of the FBI.  Their collective argument is this splintering of 
effort would only serve to create another wall which, prior to the PATRIOT Act (also 
known as the Uniting and Strengthening American by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001), prevented intelligence 
sharing among the CIA and the FBI.  This wall also complicated the common sense 
practice of FBI special agents assigned to foreign counterintelligence and 
counterterrorism matters in openly discussing information obtained in intelligence 
collection operations with special agents assigned to work traditional criminal matters.10  
If only to prevent something like this from ever happening again, it would be wise, 
proponents say, to maintain the FBI’s primacy in the domestic intelligence arena. 
Ronald Kessler, a former FBI special agent, is the author of many books in the 
intelligence and national security genre as is his most recent book, The Terrorist Watch: 
inside the Desperate Race to Stop the Next Attack. Kessler and those he interviews argue 
forcefully of the FBI’s (and CIA’s) efforts to transform and attack the networks of 





                                                 
10 Jamie Gorlick, “Instructions on Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal 
Investigations,” Center for National Security Studies (March 1995), 




reveals how the FBI and CIA are working in concert to defeat the threat abroad and at 
home, which is contrary to many who suggest cooperation has yet to be found between 
these two, historically rival, agencies.11 
Even prior to the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (initially 
named the Terrorist Threat Integration Center [TTIC]), Dr. Larry Wortzel posited that the 
United States was not in need of a separate domestic intelligence agency or a national 
fusion center, which he believes would further complicate sharing and “stovepipe” 
information.12  Further, Wortzel suggests that the domestic intelligence agencies from 
which we would potentially model in the United States have not been particularly 
effective: 
The events of September 11… [have] led many policymakers to 
recommend the creation of a domestic intelligence agency to gather and 
analyze intelligence on people and threats generated from within the 
United States. This approach has not been particularly effective in Canada, 
although it has worked for England; however, such an agency would 
seriously intrude on the civil liberties of Americans.13  
Wortzel continues this line of thinking by stating that instead of creating yet more 
governmental organizations, Congress and the President should enact legislation to 
ensure the FBI and CIA collaborate more effectively.14  
4. A Review of Literature Proposing Changes to the Intelligence 
Community, but Fall Short of Proposing a New Domestic Intelligence 
Agency 
Two of the most comprehensive reports on the intelligence community post 9/11 
are the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States or 9/11 
                                                 
11 Ronald Kessler, The Terrorist Watch: Inside the Desperate Race to Stop the Next Attack, 1st ed., 
(New York: Crown Forum, 2007). 
12 Larry Wortzel, “Americans Do Not Need a New Domestic Spy Agency to Improve Intelligence and 
Homeland Security,” The Heritage Foundation (January 10, 2003), 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/EM848.cfm (accessed January 5, 2008).  





Commission Report (for short) and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the 
United States, also known as the WMD report. Within these two reports arguably exists 
the most comprehensive review of the intelligence community after the attacks of 9/11 
and the failure to locate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.   
These two bipartisan commissions, comprised of individuals with access to highly 
classified information and the organizations which produce the same, failed to reach the 
same conclusions as those of Posner, Zegart, and others who called for establishing a new 
domestic intelligence agency divorced of the FBI. Critics might assume their positions 
within the government is precisely the reason why commissioners of these reports fell 
short of calling for such radical changes to the structure of the intelligence community.  
Whatever the reasons, these two commissions produced exhaustive reports on the 
structure, processes, and results of the organizations that comprise the intelligence 
community and yet declined to propose the creation of a new domestic intelligence 
agency. These reports give considerable weight to the arguments expressed by Kessler, 
Wortzel, and others that it would be unwise to create a new domestic intelligence 
apparatus. Wortzel states, “Clearly, the threat of future terrorist attacks on the homeland 
requires that the current process of information sharing within the entire intelligence 
community be changed. What the federal government should not do is further 'stovepipe' 
and compartmentalize intelligence in an additional agency.”15 The creation of a new 
agency would only further complicate and dangerously slow the dissemination of 
domestic threat information with potentially catastrophic consequences. 
The question then remains, how does the United States adequately protect itself 
from terrorist attack, foreign counterintelligence penetration, and international criminal 
enterprises without intruding further into the civil liberties of its citizens?  It can only do 
so by striking a careful balance of law enforcement and intelligence collection operations 
under a single agency charged with the mandate of maintaining a strict adherence to the 
Constitution of the United States, and doing so in a way that efficiently exploits 
                                                 




intelligence, fuses collection efforts, and disrupts terrorist, foreign intelligence, and 
criminal enterprises within a historically proven legal framework. 
Chapter II reviews the state of the FBI pre-9/11 and the role of counterterrorism 
within the organization. Chapter III addresses transformation strategies against a 
backdrop of regenerating threats against the homeland and how those threat shape the 
way the agency transforms.  Chapter III will also discuss the British model of domestic 
intelligence as conducted by the British Security Service or MI-5. 
In Chapter IV, the thesis reviews the achievements and progress the FBI has made 
to date and the implementation of a new business model called “SET,” which is short for 
Strategic Execution Team.  This strategy shifts the paradigm of the FBI as an agency bent 
first on arrests and prosecutions into one focused on collection and exploitation first, 
followed by timely and well-orchestrated disruptions of networks and terrorist 
enterprises. 
Chapter V draws conclusions about the FBI’s progress and makes 
recommendations for the FBI’s future as a hybrid agency capable of conducting both 
intelligence collection and law enforcement operations and attempts to make the case that 








II. STATE OF THE FBI PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
A. STRUCTURE 
To discuss the current and proposed changes underway at the FBI and how these 
changes demonstrate a departure from the way the FBI has historically conducted 
operations, it is necessary to look at portions of the bureau’s history in order to place into 
context the changes taking place in the agency’s effort to confront and defeat the terrorist 
threat to the homeland.  
Prior to September 11, 2001 and for most of the FBI’s modern history, the bureau 
was divided up into “divisions” at FBI headquarters (FBIHQ) and “field offices” 
throughout the continental United States and certain territories. These divisions were 
responsible for the management and oversight of the programs for which they were 
named.  For example, the Criminal Division was and remains responsible for providing 
oversight, direction, and management of investigative programs focused and continue to 
focus on financial crime, violent crime, organized crime, public corruption, etc; the 
Counterintelligence Division addresses foreign intelligence threats, and so on.   
As a direct result of the FBI’s long and storied law enforcement heritage, the 
division which wielded the most influence in the bureau prior to September 11, 2001 was 
the Criminal Investigative Division (CID). As the program constituting the main function 
of the FBI, the Criminal Division was responsible for the oversight of all criminal 
investigations throughout the FBI’s 56 field offices.  The division has a history rich in 
achievements and highlights, many of which have solidified the FBI’s reputation as one 
of, if not the, premier law enforcement organization in the world. The Counterterrorism 
Division, which, interestingly, did not attain divisional status until the late 1990’s, also 
had its roots in the criminal division, where it started as a “section” within CID. 
Separate from headquarters and spread across the entire continental United States, 
including Hawaii and Alaska, were and are 56 “field offices” which comprise the actual 




and analytical personnel actively investigating the nearly 300 violations for which the 
FBI has jurisdiction. This thesis will provide more details about the makeup of the field 
offices, but further examination of the headquarters construct is necessary in order to 
understand the driving force behind the changes taking place bureau-wide.   
Prior to September 11, 2001, the FBI was primarily vested in criminal 
investigations as “Staff Statement Number 9” in the 9/11 Commission Report effectively 
demonstrates.  In this statement, it reports the FBI had only 1,300 “agents” working on 
counterterrorism matters in September 2001, making this number only about 6 percent of 
the total FBI workforce.16  While one can argue with the accuracy of the numbers in 
terms of percentages (the staff statement compared the number of agents working 
counterterrorism matters to the entire bureau workforce, instead of the actual number of 
FBI special agents, which at the time was about 11,000), it is difficult to defend the idea 
the FBI was dedicating adequate resources to counter the growing threat of terrorism. 
Regardless of the numbers, the FBI’s work in counterterrorism was not 
consistently being conducted in a proactive fashion. In fact, and as further discussed in 
“Staff Statement 9,” the FBI was primarily conducting investigative activities in a 
reactive way–to events that had already occurred as opposed to addressing the more 
difficult mission of proactive investigations, utilizing and creating a predictive 
intelligence capacity to thwart acts of terror–not simply reacting to events. This is far 
different than what is taking place within the bureau today, specifically as it relates to the 
way counterterrorism division and field offices are proactively addressing threats and 
utilizing sources to target hotbeds of radicalism both domestically and abroad. The 
elimination of the old reactive approach is what cuts to the heart of why the FBI is 
embracing transformation. 
                                                 
16 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Law Enforcement, 
Counterterrorism, and Intelligence Collection in the United States Prior to 9/11, Staff Statement Number 




B. CHANGING THE PARADIGM 
Just as the way the terrorist threat has changed the culture of U.S. society, so too 
has it changed the culture within FBIHQ. The “center of gravity” within the bureau is 
vastly different than it was prior to 9/11 with Counterterrorism Division (CTD) 
investigations now being the most heavily addressed by senior executive leadership.  This 
change of focus forces CTD to direct operations in the field through its headquarters' 
supervisors and unit chiefs who are placed in charge of regions and investigative sub-
programs. Without question, there is no other division in the FBI that has such direct 
oversight of investigations as the way operations are managed by CTD to the field 
offices.   
Although the transformational progress of the FBI will be discussed in a 
following chapter, some space will be devoted here to provide the reader an overview of 
the primary investigative and support divisions as they currently exist within the FBI. In 
order of descending nationally dictated priorities, the FBI is responsible for the following 
investigative programs: 
1. Counterterrorism Division 
The mission of the Counterterrorism Division is to detect, disrupt, and dismantle 
terrorists or terrorist activities in the United States before they act; to identify and prevent 
acts of terrorism by individuals with a terrorist agenda acting alone; to detect, disrupt, and 
dismantle terrorist support networks, including financial support networks; to enhance the 
U.S. capability to ascertain the reliability, implications, and details of terrorist threats and 
to improve the capacity to disseminate threat-related information to local, state, and 









contribution to the U.S. intelligence community and to senior policy makers in 
government by providing timely and accurate in-depth analysis of the terrorist threat and 
other information of value on an on-going basis.17 
Within this framework, CTD has two primary operational branches, both of which 
have investigative primacy over a specific target set. Operations Branch I is responsible 
for international terror groups, that is, foreign-based terror groups and potential “sleeper 
agents” here in the United States. Operations Branch II is responsible for domestic terror 
groups, which typically exist in one of several categories: white supremacists, militia 
movements, sovereign citizens, black separatists, anti-abortion extremists, animal and 
earth liberation movements, and environmental extremists.  
Given the terror attacks of 9/11, the continued threat to the homeland by Al-
Qa’ida-inspired groups, and the perceived persecution of Islam from the military actions 
in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Operations Branch I is a robust organization broken down 
further into two investigative sections. These two sections comprise the oversight and 
program management function for all international terrorism investigations taking place 
within the United States or overseas where the FBI is a party in interest. They are 
explained further below. 
a. International Terrorism Operations Section I (ITOS I) 
The primary function of ITOS I is to support, coordinate, and provide 
oversight of FBI international counterterrorism operations as they specifically relate to 
international extremist groups and/or individuals who are directly or indirectly targeting 
the United States. ITOS I is broken down further into six (evenly by overall caseload) 
Continental Unites States (CONUS) Units which oversee FBI Counterterrorism 
Investigations in a specified geographic area. The mission of ITOS I is directly in line 
with the overall mission of the FBI's number one priority: the prevention of terrorist acts  
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against the United States and its interests abroad. Put simply, ITOS I is domestically 
focused against terrorist actors, facilitators, and supporters.  See Figure 1 below to see the 
geographic breakdown within CONUS.18 
ITOS I CONUS UNIT GEOGRAPHIC 
BOUNDARIES
CONUS 1 CONUS 2 CONUS 3
CONUS 4 CONUS 5 CONUS 6
 
Figure 1. CONUS Unit Boundaries 
b. International Terrorism Operations Section II (ITOS II): 
The primary function of ITOS II is to support, coordinate, and provide 
oversight of FBI international counterterrorism operations overseas. ITOS II is broken 
down further into six units:  Extraterritorial Investigations Unit’s One, Two, and Three; 
the Strategic Operations Unit; the Fly Team; and the High Value Detainee Unit. The 
mission of ITOS II is directly in line with the overall mission of the FBI's number one 
priority, the prevention of terrorist acts against the United States and its interests abroad.  
Consequently, ITOS II is focused externally against terrorist actors, facilitators, and 
supporters currently outside the continental United States (OCONUS). See Figure 2 
below.19 
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Figure 2. ITOS II Unit Breakdown 
2. Counterintelligence Division 
As stated by the FBI:  
The foreign intelligence threat currently facing the United States from 
foreign nation-state and non-state actors is increasingly complex and 
asymmetrical. U.S. national security is gravely threatened by foreign 
intelligence services and their assets who are dedicated to using all means 
at their disposal to obtain strategic information which enhances the 
strategic position of their country while disadvantaging the United States. 
Our adversaries are especially active in areas where they perceive great 
Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) vulnerabilities.  
Protection of U.S. national security is the FBI's top priority. FCI is a 
critical component of the FBI's overall strategy, second only to 
counterterrorism. As the lead agency for FCI in the United States, and the 
primary investigative component of the Department of Justice, the FBI has 
the responsibility to oversee the integration of U.S. law enforcement and 
intelligence efforts to ensure that all available means are brought to bear to 
mitigate this ongoing and daunting threat, consistent with our laws and 
policy.20   
                                                 
20 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “National Security Branch,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, 




The Counterintelligence Division is also a division rich with successes in the 
bureau’s hundred-year history.  In addition to an infamous list of spies caught by the FBI, 
including former CIA Officer Aldrich Ames, many might be surprised to learn the FBI 
operated an overseas clandestine intelligence service known as the SIS or the Special 
Intelligence Service prior to and throughout World War II.  The SIS had as many as 360 
agents conducting clandestine intelligence activities throughout Central and South 
America in much the same way the CIA operates today.21  Although disbanded shortly 
after World War II, this service was the backbone of Director J. Edgar Hoover’s 
argument that the United States did not need a new “Worldwide Intelligence Service” as 
proposed by William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan, then the head of the CIA’s predecessor 
organization, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).22  Director Hoover ultimately lost 
the argument with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, which formally 
created the Central Intelligence Agency. 
The FBI and the counterintelligence division also suffered some well-publicized 
failures such as the identification, arrest, and conviction of Robert Hanssen in February 
of 2001. Hanssen, a FBI special agent assigned to Russian Counterintelligence matters, 
was convicted of selling thousands of pages of classified intelligence to first Soviet and 
later Russian intelligence organizations. The deception conducted by Hanssen would 
make him one of the most dangerous double agents in U.S. history.23  Despite this, the 
successes of the division continue today: in Investigation 2007 alone, the FBI 
Counterintelligence Division, in conjunction with the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 
United States Attorney’s Office, succeeded in convicting 24 individuals for espionage or 
otherwise attempting to steal the nation’s most sensitive information.24  
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3. Cyber Investigations 
According to the FBI’s public website(s):  
The FBI's Cyber Division, established in 2002, is dedicated to applying 
the highest level of technical capital toward combating cyber-based 
terrorism, hostile intelligence operations conducted over the Internet, and 
cyber crime. By aggregating cyber-centered investigations within one 
division, the FBI is able to more effectively and efficiently identify, 
investigate, and neutralize cyber threats. As the nation becomes more 
cyber-dependent, the FBI's Cyber Division will be the vanguard of 
security for its citizens and its critical infrastructures.25  
Of the FBI’s investigative divisions, the Cyber Division is the newest to be 
formed in response to a growing, pervasive threat against not only computer 
infrastructure but actual infrastructure which is controlled by an increasingly complex 
system of interwoven technologies.  The Cyber Division works collaboratively with all of 
the other investigative divisions to address a sophisticated enemy that is more than 
college-aged hackers attacking government websites. 
Criminals of today see computer technology and internet connectivity as a way to 
insulate themselves from their nefarious activity and at the same time increase their 
reach, impacting a much larger pool of potential victims than ever thought possible.  
Criminal elements that infect governmental agencies and private corporations with 
“Trojan Worms” or other virus cause millions of dollars of damage which can be passed 
on to the taxpayer by way of increased service fees.  Denial of service attacks are also 
used by hostile foreign services as a way of probing the strength of government websites, 
which could one day be used as a prelude to an actual attack against the homeland or U.S. 
interests abroad.  Even on their own, these attacks could constitute what Marine General 
James Cartwright calls “a weapon of mass destruction.”26 
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4. Criminal Investigative Division (CID) 
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation Strategic Plan, 2004 – 2009: 
The mission of the Criminal Investigative Division (CID) is to coordinate, 
manage, and direct investigative programs focused on financial crime, 
violent crime, organized crime, public corruption, violation of individual 
civil rights, drug related crime, and informant matters associated with 
these investigative areas. Through centralized control, CID guides the 
investigative efforts of field offices against criminal enterprises and 
individual federal crimes in the continental and territorial United States, as 
well as internationally. CID is responsible for devising policy matters and 
techniques to be used in complicated investigations, as well as for making 
a continuous review of investigative procedures and programs. In addition, 
CID maintains top-level liaison with officials in the Department of Justice, 
as well as other Government agencies and foreign law enforcement 
officials, on matters under the jurisdiction of the FBI for the purpose of 
coordinating and resolving major policy matters concerning both criminal 
cases and civil litigations. 27 
Within the Criminal Investigation Division, the FBI again ranks or sets priorities 
among its investigative responsibilities as follows: 
• Public Corruption 
• Civil Rights 
• Transnational / National Criminal Enterprises 
• White Collar Crime 
• Significant Violent Crime 
The Criminal Investigative Division has been, for decades, the backbone of the 
FBI.  From hunting and apprehending violent criminals independently, or as part of a task 
force, to arresting corporate criminals bent on bilking the public and its own shareholders 
of millions, sometimes billions of dollars, the CID continues to be a major component of 
the FBI.  Despite the post 9/11 reorganization instituted by Director Robert S. Mueller, 
III, which sent several thousand agents to address immediate and lingering 
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counterterrorism and counterintelligence threats, approximately 50 percent of the special 
agents in the FBI are still assigned to work criminal investigations. As stated by the 
director in a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee in March of 2008: 
To meet our national security mission, the FBI had to shift personnel and 
resources, but we remain committed to our major criminal responsibilities. 
While Americans justifiably worry about terrorism, it is crime that most 
directly touches their lives. Currently, we have roughly a 50/50 balance 
between national security and criminal programs. To make the best use of 
these resources, we will continue to focus on those areas where we bring 
something unique to the table and to target those criminal threats against 
which we have the most substantial and lasting impact.28    
In the same testimony, Director Mueller explains the end result of reassigning so 
many agents to the National Security Branch is the FBI’s Criminal Division has been 
forced to address a much more focused group of criminal actions, “In recent years, we 
have moved away from drug cases and smaller white collar crimes, but we have 
dedicated more agents and more resources to public corruption, violent crime, civil 
rights, transnational organized crime, corporate fraud, and crimes against children.”29 
Despite this more restrictive use of criminal investigative resources, CID amassed 
an impressive set of statistical accomplishments in fiscal year 2007, including working 
more than 53,000 cases. What’s more impressive is an indictment to conviction rate of 
nearly 70 percent with 17,728 arrests, and 12,406 convictions.30 As it is perhaps only 
jokingly said within the halls of FBI offices throughout the country, “Criminal Division 
still pays the bills.” Clearly, the FBI’s successes in criminal investigations are important 
to the nation, the state, and local law enforcement agencies with whom there exists a 
critical and growing partnership.  
                                                 






C. FIELD DIVISIONS AND INVESTIGATIVE PRIORITIES 
Under the leadership of Director Louis J. Freeh (September 1, 1993 - June 25, 
2001), and arguably under all previous directors save J. Edgar Hoover (May 10, 1924 - 
May 2, 1972), the center of gravity for the FBI’s leadership was situated at the field 
office level, under the supervision of powerful “special agent’s in charge” (SAC) and in 
some of the largest offices, “assistant director’s in charge” (ADIC).31 This was 
particularly evident under Director Freeh’s leadership as the FBI began to actually 
eliminate supervisory positions at headquarters, forcing senior leaders back to the field to 
manage operations in a more autonomous, decentralized fashion, leaving FBIHQ to focus 
on issues related to program management, policy, and administration.  
One of these headquarters’ policies was to ensure the FBI field offices were 
responsive in dealing with the crime issues impacting the region for which they had 
operational oversight. Until recently, the FBI accomplished this by executing what were 
called “Crime Surveys.” These surveys collected data among federal, state, and local 
agencies, including the District and United States Attorney’s Offices in order to discern 
what crime problems were perceived as most troubling the area. From this data, the FBI 
field office prioritized its goals and objectives to more accurately reflect the needs of the 
region, to better assist state and local partners, and to better protect the citizenry from 
violence, fraud, and/or terrorism.  
Given that crime problems differ from region to region, many of the field offices 
that ranked their investigative priorities based on their respective crime surveys often 
found their priorities differed from the national priorities established in Washington, D.C.  
For example, in some regions violent crime was not as defined a problem as say, bank 
fraud, health care fraud, or mortgage fraud. In this particular field office then, the violent 
crime program would be seconded to the white-collar crime program in terms of 
importance.  State and local law enforcement agencies can provide critical “ground truth” 
with respect to understanding the primary crime issue in their areas of responsibility.   
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In a recent meeting with the deputy chief of a major metropolitan sheriff’s 
department, the author asked the chief to name his city’s number one crime concern.  
Without pause, the chief said his major threat was that neighborhoods were increasingly 
falling sway to gang violence and citizens were not able to sit on their own front porches 
during the evening for fear of attack and intimidation. It is this ground truth, combined 
with analytical research about emerging crime trends, which provides the optimal way to 
determine an agency’s investigative priorities.  
Prior to 9/11, the debate about these conflicts between field office and 
headquarters concerning investigative priorities was much more insular and limited to 
SAC conferences and inspection findings. After 9/11, this topic became the focus of 
critical importance as internal policies were enacted by the FBI to place terrorism at the 
top of each division’s investigative priority list. Today, each field office places terrorism 
at the top of each of its lists of investigative priorities, but a more analytical review of this 
dictated prioritization is taking place and may impact individual field offices rankings as 
will be seen later.   
D. THE ROAD AHEAD 
September 11, 2001 revealed certain, but not necessarily unknown, flaws in the 
way the FBI, in general, and the Counterterrorism Division, in particular, were structured.  
While the leadership understood the importance of the work, few realized the magnitude 
to which terrorists could a) strike at the homeland and b) impact citizens psychologically.  
CTD was an understaffed division working on the fifth floor of FBI headquarters and had 
limited connectivity to other agencies within the intelligence community or the 
Department of Defense except in some cases where managers understood their 
importance and made personal relationships to affect better exchanges of terrorist-related 
information. 
Likewise, other agencies were unaware of the FBI’s ability to collect considerable 
amounts of human intelligence through an impressive stable of cooperating witnesses, 




handlers were not effectively targeting their sources beyond the borders of their own field 
division and so much of the human intelligence (HUMINT) capability of these assets was 
not exploited.  Recent changes within CTD, such as the creation of the Counterterrorism 
HUMINT Operations Unit (CHOU), allows the FBI to more effectively target 
counterterrorism sources by temporarily transplanting hand-picked assets from one field 
office to address a critical need in another.   
While the organizational structure of CTD changed dramatically in the wake of 
9/11, little changed in the ensuing six years, that is, until January of 2008 when a 
reorganization of CTD’s Operations Branch One took effect. The reorganization or 
“realignment” has streamlined CTD’s approach to managing counterterrorism (CT cases 
through an interdivisional breakout of responsibilities between the two sections which 
make up Operations Branch One.  
The FBI’s Counterterrorism Division is broken down into two operational 
branches. These branches, named “Operations Branch I and II,” divide the divisions’ 
investigative responsibilities as follows: Operations Branch I is responsible for the 
program management of all investigations related to international terrorism irrespective 
of the threat.  This means that the two sections under Operations Branch I investigate 
radical Islamist organizations such as Al-Qa’ida, Hamas, and Hizballah as well as the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army, Basque Separatists or “ETA,” the Tamil Tigers, and 
many others.  Operations Branch II, on the other hand, is responsible for domestic threats 
such as racial supremacist organizations like Aryan Nations, the Ku Klux Klan, and 
World Church of the Creator; single interest terror groups like the Earth and Animal 
Liberation Front, and, finally, violent separatist organizations. Until very recently, 
Operations Branch II maintained the FBI’s rapid investigative projection arm commonly 
known as the “Fly Team,” but that too has been relocated to Operations Branch I as the 
greatest need for these assets is OCONUS when terrorism strikes U.S. interests or allies 
abroad. 
To create a division that fully exploits its resources and the knowledge it has 




recent of which is the implementation of the concepts created by the FBI’s Strategic 
Execution Team (SET). The SET process is determined to produce a systematic and 
uniform field intelligence collection capacity focused on a thorough understanding of 
each field office’s “domain” or area of operations. This domain awareness is the 
capability of the field intelligence group (FIG) to understand the current threat picture as 
well as the vulnerabilities and then address these gaps through collection.   
This type of strategic thinking has been conducted somewhat haphazardly until 
recently and formalizing this understanding is critical in the FBI’s maturation as a 
domestic intelligence and law enforcement agency. As Director Mueller stated, “Today, 
we are focused on prevention, not simply prosecution. We have shifted from detecting, 
deterring, and disrupting terrorist enterprises to detecting, penetrating, and dismantling 
such enterprises — part of the FBI’s larger culture shift to a threat-driven intelligence and 
law enforcement agency.”32 
History shows the FBI’s role as a domestic intelligence agency is nearly a century 
in the making.  After the formation of the FBI in 1908, then known simply as the “Bureau 
of Investigation,” agents were marshaled to combat the threat of anarchists and 
“socialists” such as those who firebombed a series of homes and business throughout the 
United States between 1915 and 1920. Even President Woodrow Wilson’s own Attorney 
General, A. Mitchell Palmer, was the victim of a bombing which nearly took his life and 
those of his family. These bombings and violent labor strikes prompted Palmer to 
conduct a series of group arrests, known as the “Palmer Raids,” against those suspected 
of sympathizing with the Bolsheviks who came to power in Russia in 1917. Palmer 
promoted a young DOJ lawyer named J. Edgar Hoover to oversee these raids and 
subsequent deportations of those identified as aliens presenting a threat to the national 
security of the United States. Despite the backlash that would later come with the conduct 
of these raids, the actions were largely applauded at the time given the massive strikes 
and work stoppages, which resulted from labor unrest — as much as a result of socialist 
and anarchist organizations throughout the country. 
                                                 




In World War II, the FBI tracked the spies of the Axis powers both inside the 
United States and overseas stopping plots such as a group of Nazi saboteurs who landed 
on the New Jersey shore in 1942 bent on attacking U.S. defense plants. After World War 
II, the FBI followed the trail of expatriate Nazi leaders in South America following 
Germany’s surrender in 1945.  
During the long Cold War that followed the brief peace after WW II, the FBI 
again was called upon to track the growing counterintelligence threat of the Soviet Union.  
From Soviet spies to double agents, the FBI spent decades identifying these spies and 
turning them back against their own homeland with spectacular success.  Unfortunately, 
the FBI was also forced to track and arrest many U.S. citizens turned by the Soviets 
against the homeland. From the Rosenbergs, John Walker, and Jonathan Pollard, to 
Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, the FBI has time and again achieved successes as 
both a law enforcement and intelligence agency capable of implementing sensitive 
collection techniques and using that collection as evidence in a court of law. 
Today the FBI is again facing a period of great change, which requires it to 
transform itself into a more agile, predictive agency capable of preventing acts of terror, 








III. TRANSFORMATION IN A DANGEROUS AGE 
A. TRANSFORMATION CONSIDERATIONS 
The major issue in the ongoing debate of whether or not to create a new agency 
dedicated to domestic intelligence rests primarily in the answer to this question: Will the 
FBI be able to assume the role of the nation’s domestic intelligence agency given its law 
enforcement culture. Some argue that the FBI, as an agency within the Department of 
Justice, cannot transition from a culture whose primary mission is to investigate crimes, 
collect evidence, and then present it for prosecution to one that subordinates prosecutions 
to intelligence collection.  But, the distance between intelligence collection and criminal 
prosecution is not measured by culture; rather, it is measured by time.  
It is unlikely that Americans will find fault in an agency that as part of its core 
values maintains a “rigorous obedience to the Constitution of the United States.”33 As 
one of the FBI’s written “Core Values,” this statement should lessen the anxiety of those 
who believe the government’s agents pry into the lives of American citizens without 
proper predication. There are those who may believe, however, that such statements show 
a degree of naivety. Intelligence agencies, by nature, must be able to exist in ambiguous 
space between right and wrong.    
So where does the common ground lie between the two schools of thought?  
Clearly, the FBI will not embrace a “collect at all costs” mentality, which raises questions 
about the legality of the intelligence or the evidence it collects during the course of its 
investigations.  It will, however, attempt to promote a culture of “prevention through 
intelligence” using every facet of its traditional investigative, HUMINT collection, and 
analytical capabilities in an attempt to prevent crime, acts of terror, or other national 
security threats against the United States. 
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Even before the FBI instituted the transformational doctrine established in the 
SET framework the Counterterrorism Division, it placed new requirements on itself and 
on the 56 field offices to second quick criminal prosecutions to long-term intelligence 
collection in most if not all of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Investigations.  
The establishment of this new policy has changed the nature of the FBI’s business 
practices. While there has been some internal resistance, it is slowly creating an FBI that 
no longer sees prosecution as the solitary goal of every case, but rather a tool to be used 
in the disruption phase of the investigation — after the intelligence collection process has 
run its course and is no longer providing information of intelligence value. This idea gave 
birth to transformational policies set forth in the SET process for incorporation into the 
entire FBI. 
1. A “Hybrid” Agency 
The fact that the FBI is able to maintain the organic prosecutorial option, in 
addition to its domestic intelligence function, makes the FBI a hybrid agency capable of 
collecting critical intelligence about a target and disseminating information to the 
intelligence community while the investigation is producing it, and at the same time, 
cataloguing and preserving that information for use as evidence in a potential trial. Since 
most terrorism or even foreign intelligence investigations are, by their very nature, 
criminal conspiracies or enterprises, the ability to collect and disseminate intelligence and 
then use that collection as evidence seems like a fait accompli. The antithesis of this 
would be to separate these two interwoven pieces of the investigation fabric and force 
one agency to collect intelligence and another to act as merely the legal vehicle to take 
these “intelligence collection” cases to court for prosecution. As incongruous as it 
sounds, this is what is taking place in many of agencies used by the FBI’s foreign 
partners. 
In response, some suggest that a domestic intelligence agency, bound by laws that 
will involve bringing evidence before a federal bench, will adversely inhibit the agency, 




sensitive sources and methods in a public forum. Through such disclosure, the 
intelligence agency inadvertently tips its hand to the enemy by educating them on how 
the government collects intelligence against targets, which helps them thwart 
investigators in the future.   
2. FBI Investigations and FISA 
The FBI has for years carried the responsibilities of a hybrid agency, but it was 
not until 1978 and the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that 
the FBI’s use of electronic surveillance was authorized by a court. From World War II 
until that time, according to Loch Johnson and James Wirtz, “the procedures authorizing 
the collection of electronic surveillance for national security purposes [was] presidential 
authorization.”34 The use of FISA authorized electronic surveillance has grown 
exponentially since 9/11, but it has not done so carelessly.   
National security investigations conducted by the FBI must be based on legitimate 
predication.  The three levels of investigations within the FBI’s National Security Branch 
are assessments, preliminary investigations, and full investigations. Each level of 
investigation is limited on the number of techniques that investigators may use, from the 
limited checking of open source and government data bases (assessments) all the way to 
electronic surveillance (full investigations).   
A complaint or other intelligence is received by the FBI and, based on the 
confidence level of the information and the credibility of the source, the agent begins the 
process of opening the case. First, a supervisor is notified by the agent, and, then, 
electronically through an automated case opening process (and after a review of the 
information), the supervisor then approves or denies the opening of the investigation.  For 
sensitive investigative matters and for cases involving first amendment protected speech, 
the field office’s chief division counsel (CDC) must review and support the supervisor’s 
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decision to open a case. In some circumstances, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge 
(ASAC) and the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) must also approve the opening.   
This review process ensures FBI investigations are being opened in accordance 
with the Attorney General guidelines that set forth the legal requirements used by the FBI 
to open and investigate both national security and traditional criminal matters.  The use of 
FISA authorized techniques, such as electronic surveillance, can also be a complex and 
onerous task, but it was made so purposely to ensure the most sensitive investigative 
techniques are used after all other measures have been proven unsuccessful or when 
exigent circumstances dictate their immediate invocation.    
Once an agent has opened a full investigation, he or she can use a multitude of 
investigative techniques to pursue a subject, the most intrusive of which is electronic 
surveillance. If an agent wishes to pursue telephonic surveillance on a subject, for 
instance, he or she must do so by creating an application wherein the agent sets forth 
evidence to show the subject is a “foreign power” or an “agent of a foreign power.” In 
much the same way a research paper is written, the agent must ensure all the 
corroboration, sources, and incriminating data is kept in a separate file for a legal review 
to which all electronic surveillance cases are subjected. 
Once the agent completes this application, it is forwarded to the supervisor for 
reviews. It is then reviewed by the field office chief division counsel, the ASAC, and, 
finally, the SAC. After all levels have approved the initial application, the package is 
pushed electronically to the National Security Law Branch (NSLB) and the headquarters 
“substantive desk” responsible for the program. International terrorism cases are 
managed by either ITOS I or ITOS II and within these sections are specific units 
responsible for the management of geographic areas both CONUS and OCONUS. See 
Figures 1 and 2.  
NSLB provides the final legal review of the application before the package is sent 
to the Department of Justice’s Office of Intelligence. The DOJ lawyers assigned to this 
office begin the process of creating the application for presentation to the Foreign 




Once sent to the DOJ, Office of Intelligence (OI) lawyers communicate directly 
with field office agents, as well as the substantive desk supervisor who is ultimately 
responsible for taking the case to the FISC and swearing to its accuracy.  This process 
can be a lengthy one and is dependent upon many factors. Each FISA application is 
designated a “Tier” to ensure the most urgent requests are dealt with in the most timely 
manner. Emergency applications, or “EA’s” as they are commonly known, can be 
approved almost immediately under extraordinary circumstances first by the FBI Director 
and then by the Attorney General or another official of the executive branch so 
authorized by the president.  Typically, these designees are the Deputy Attorney General, 
the National Security Advisor, the Director of National Intelligence, or the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency. Once an EA is approved, the FBI and DOJ must present a 
completed FISA application to the FISC within 72 hours or must terminate the 
surveillance. If the FISC does not concur with the emergency authorization intercept, it 
will order the termination of the surveillance and can order the FBI to inform the subject 
that he or she was the subject of such intercept.  Although this likelihood is extremely 
rare, it ensures that all levels of government adhere to the strictest of measures when 
seeking the most intrusive techniques at the FBI’s disposal. 
In normal circumstances, however, it takes considerable time to complete a 
package.  Once satisfied, all parties sign the application and accuracy forms and the case 
is presented to the court by the FBIHQ supervisory special agent and the DOJ OI 
attorney. The FISC is made up of seven judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court.  Each judge serves for a staggered, seven-year term and is selected from 
a separate U.S. Judicial District.     
In much the same way cases are presented in federal court, the government states 
its case against the subject, in the case that the subject is a foreign power or acting as an 
agent of a foreign power. In so doing, the government requests authority to conduct a 
specific type of electronic surveillance or searches requested by the FBI and the court can 
either approve or deny the application. The government has been very attentive to the 




to the annual memorandum to Congress regarding the use of FISA to collect foreign 
intelligence, in 2007 the government made 2,371 applications for electronic surveillance, 
electronic surveillance combined with physical searches, or simply physical searches.  Of 
these, the FISC approved 2370. The FISC made “substantive changes” to the 
government’s proposed orders in 86 FISA packages before authorizing them.35   
3. FBI and the United States Attorney’s Office 
This ability to collect electronic surveillance as part of an intelligence or other 
national security investigation is only half the formula for executing the role of both an 
intelligence and law enforcement agency. Many domestic intelligence agencies can 
collect information, but to be able to turn that collection into evidence requires another 
key linkage that has existed within the FBI since its inception—the United States 
Attorney.   
In most circumstances, the FBI conducts investigations in coordination with the 
United States Attorney’s Office (USAO). Each USAO has line attorneys assigned to 
address the prosecutorial needs of the FBI’s national security investigations. Agents meet 
with these attorneys to chart a course for the investigations provided the ultimate goal of 
the case is a disruption by arrest and prosecution.  This early coordination is important in 
the maturation of the investigation because jointly the agents and attorneys can 
collaborate to determine what collection must be used or furthered in order to present a 
successful prosecution. 
Once sufficient intelligence has been collected, the FBI and the USAO seek 
“Attorney General Use Authority” for each piece of intelligence collected under FISA 
before it can be used in court. This ensures the methods used were conducted under 
appropriate legal authority and that the disclosure of the collection in federal court does 
not damage the long-term collection strategies of the United States.   
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After obtaining “use authority,” the case proceeds in much the same way as any 
other federal case—through the use of indictments, arrests, and trials in U.S. District 
Court. This ability to collaborate with the USAO independent of a separate law 
enforcement organization and use the intelligence collected “in house” is much different 
than other domestic intelligence or law enforcement agencies used by foreign 
governments. Most governments with “stand alone” domestic intelligences agencies must 
work with a sponsoring law enforcement agency which often times is not aware of even 
the existence of a case before it is advised of it near the conclusion of the investigation. 
This usually occurs when the domestic intelligence agency sees arrest and prosecution as 
the best option to disrupt a terror plot or foreign intelligence intrusion. 
This process of using a “sponsoring” law enforcement agency to conduct an arrest 
of a subject based on another agency’s collection and then require that same law 
enforcement agency to sift through the intelligence collected in hopes of presenting 
evidence for prosecution is inefficient. Foreign domestic intelligence agencies are 
creating workaround models such as assigning law enforcement officers to their offices in 
a task force capacity, but at the end of the day, these officers belong to another agency 
and they cannot replicate the roles of an agency like the FBI whose assets are totally 
organic.  
Equally important to the long-term success of the FBI is that each agent is 
educated in the role of the USAO and legal framework that surrounds a case bound for 
prosecution. Agents assigned to work criminal matters can be reassigned to national 
security squads as investigative methods and the legal requirements needed to take a case 
to court are no different than what they have been accustomed to in their careers as 
criminal agents. While they will have to adhere to new internal requirements placed upon 
agents conducting terrorism and intelligence investigations, the “guts” of the 
investigative process is the same.  This also assists leaders in cross-training personnel and 
refreshes investigative strategies by ensuring imaginative methods of casework are 





Unfortunately, the United States has been forced to weigh the differences of 
employing military, intelligence, or investigative actions against an enemy.  In the fall of 
1998, the National Security Council held discussions concerning Usama bin Laden and 
whether he was the target of military action or the subject of a legal process.  Bin Laden 
had been identified as the mastermind of the East Africa Embassy bombings in Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.  When asked about the outcome of this decision, 
Madeline Albright, then U.S. Secretary of State, said, “We decided it was both.” 36  
Further, William Cohen, then U.S. Secretary of Defense, said forcing to decide between 
whether bin Laden was a military target or a law enforcement one was a “false choice” 
and stated that all instruments of American power should be brought to bear 
simultaneously.37   
Much the same argument can be made when considering a separation between the 
law enforcement and intelligence collection functions of the FBI. The elimination of one 
of these elements may result in the creation of a much more cumbersome, less nimble, 
and more divisive government strategy in combating terrorism and hostile intelligence 
collection agents targeting the United States. 
B. OVERSEAS PLOTTING AND THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES 
One of the primary functions of the FBI’s International Terrorism Operations 
Section II, is developing cooperative liaison with the counterterrorism divisions of 
foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The FBI does this through two 
specific units, Extraterritorial Investigations Unit I and II. These units consult daily with 
foreign partners unilaterally through local liaison in Washington, D.C. and through the 
legal attaché offices embedded within the U.S. Embassies abroad.  These “legats” work 
directly with the foreign services on issues of joint concern and ensure the seamless and 
timely passage of terrorism-related information across the agencies.  This coordination, 
especially on law enforcement to law enforcement levels, is not replicated by any other 
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agency within the United States government (USG) and is critical to the success of 
combating the terrorist threat abroad and to keep it from coming to the United States.   
Highlighting the concern about threats to the United States being launched from 
foreign soil, Former Secretary Michael Chertoff of the Department of Homeland Security 
said recently that “One of the things we have become concerned about lately is the 
possibility of Europe becoming a platform for a threat against the United States.”  He 
added, “We have watched the rise of home-grown terrorism,” citing the Madrid train 
bombing in March 2004 and recent foiled plots in Britain and Germany, “that suggests to 
us that the terrorists are increasingly looking to Europe both as a target and as a platform 
for terrorist attacks.”38 
To this end, the FBI has partnered with the Department of Defense in Iraq and 
Afghanistan to conduct the investigation of CONUS-based threats to that reveals a nexus 
to the homeland. By co-locating with DOD partners in active theaters of conflict, it 
enables the agency to provide near real time threat information obtained from the 
battlefield to FBIHQ and impacted field offices ad well as our foreign partners if 
necessary. This information could come from a foreign fighter network or through the 
exploitation of media or documents removed from enemy targets or personnel. Given the 
urgency and reality of the threat looming from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) within Pakistan and the threat this poses to Europe and to the United States, the 
FBI remains uniquely positioned to combat this threat both as a force multiplier with 
DOD elements in Afghanistan and with their legal attaché offices in Kabul, Afghanistan 
and Islamabad, Pakistan. 
There are no other agencies within the United States that are organized both 
domestically and abroad to address the threat from the FATA and from western 
operatives based in Europe.  Given a recent GAO report which states, “The United States 
has not met its national security goals to destroy the terrorist threat and close the safe 
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haven in Pakistan’s FATA region,” it is unlikely that the creation of another domestic 
intelligence agency would be positioned to address this threat.39  
1. Origins of the Current Threat 
Transformation is never easy. It is much less so when an agency embracing 
transformation is also effectively engaged in detecting and defeating the multitude of 
threats that face the United States.  And while the threat of terrorism prior to September 
11, 2001 was largely ephemeral to most of the American public, dedicated servants 
within the FBI, the CIA, and other national security organizations were beginning to 
guess at what the future held.  A majority of Americans and most politicians believed 
terrorism was the creation and resultant scourge of the third world and could not be 
exported to the United States in the manner which manifested itself on that crystalline-
blue, late summer day. But for those who understood the menacing threat growing in the 
east, taking shape in the form of a amorphous and loosely affiliated group, their voices 
were too few to convince governmental leadership to address the threat in a proactive 
manner.   
Nevertheless, as surely as Americans and much of the government misunderstood 
the dangers, the terrorists, too, underestimated and misread the reaction of the United 
States government to the attacks of 9/11. It is likely that the leadership within core Al-
Qa’ida thought the attacks would hurtle the United States into paralysis and inaction, and 
there is some evidence which may have led them to this conclusion. The fear of future 
attacks by Al Qa’ida and like-minded groups did lead to the most significant era of 
government restructuring since the changes implemented as a result of the National 
Security Act of 1947.   
The face of what is called “modern terrorism” has roots which are decades old.  
The teachings of the Egyptian Syed Qutb in his 1964 book Milestones had great influence 
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on Ayman al-Zawahiri, another Egyptian who is largely thought of as the theocratic 
center of al-Qa’ida, who assisted Usama bin Laden in the writing and issuance of Fatwa’s 
(or Islamic Religious Orders) from their mountain hideaways within the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. Qutb himself was borne out of the same beliefs 
that created the Muslim Brotherhood, a popular, albeit underground, Islamic 
fundamentalist movement centered, not accidentally, in Egypt.   
The ideas which Qutb and his ilk proselytized focused on a reformation, of sorts, 
of the Islamic faith—a rebuilding of the pillars of Islam and an adherence to 
fundamentalist teachings, all in an effort to restore the luster of Islamic culture to that of 
its ancient past.  Unfortunately, this sort of reformation typically results in a separation of 
cultures and a rebuff of modernity which only produces a culture that falls further behind 
its less theocratic neighbors.  This reversal of progress creates a divide composed largely 
of “have” and “have-nots” exacerbating an already present sense of disenfranchisement, 
anger, and, finally, violence toward those believed to be responsible for their plight While 
this may be an oversimplification of a longer process that leads to the subornation of 
terrorist ideologies, it illustrates the path which leads terrorists to use fear to achieve their 
military, political, and ideological objectives, which under the banner of fundamentalist 
Islam cannot be separated. 
Usama bin Laden was one of many sons and daughters born to a Saudi 
Construction magnate who, after a formal education, left the Arabian Peninsula to 
support and “fight” against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Personally rich as a result of 
his father’s good fortune to be well-liked (and well compensated by the Royal Saudi 
family), bin Laden set off for Afghanistan in the late 1980s to do what he could (mostly 
financially) for the mujahidin fighting their guerilla war against the Soviet forces 
supporting the Communist government in Kabul.   
Bin Laden received some notoriety as a supporter and leader of the mujahidin, but 
his financial assets made him a popular figure among the mujahidin. In addition, bin 





groups, was only pittance compared to the support provided to Afghanistan resistance 
leaders by the United States Central Intelligence Agency and Saudi government via 
Pakistan’s Intelligence apparatus (ISI).   
After a highly publicized defeat of the Soviets by the mujahidin, an emboldened 
bin Laden returned to his homeland of Saudi Arabia as a self-styled conquering hero, but 
this stature was short-lived.  After Saddam Hussein “blitzkrieged” through Kuwait in 
1990, bin Laden offered to raise a mujahidin army to defend the Saudi Peninsula from 
Iraq.  The Saudi Royal family repeatedly turned down their native son’s repeated offers 
of assistance in favor of the U.S. military, which infuriated and humiliated bin Laden. His 
anti-Saud family rants led him to Sudan and ultimately caused the Saudi government to 
revoke his citizenship.     
An increasingly bitter bin Laden saw the United States and its western allies as 
the chosen champion over him to defend his own homeland, and it was this perceived 
injustice which fed into his own burgeoning Islamist views to create a potent terrorist 
spark which fully ignited when set to the tender which was the Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri.  
This combination of wealth, anger, and fundamentalist doctrine gave birth to al-Qa’ida, 
an organization bent on the use of terror to sate its rage and fulfill its “divine” objectives.   
The use of fear was clearly evident in al-Qa’ida’s “coming out” declaration 
written as a fatwa in 1996.  This fatwa articulated goals for the organization, not the least 
of which was a declaration of a war against the west, which went largely unheeded by the 
United States, and a demand to the United States to pull out all troops from Islamic Holy 
Lands, especially Saudi Arabia.  At the time, the United States maintained a sizable force 
at bases on the Saudi Peninsula in order to enforce the Iraqi “No-Fly Zone” in northern 
and southern Iraq after the Gulf War. 
Bin Laden witnessed the success of guerilla tactics and the fear they inspired in 
the hearts of Soviet tank crewmen in the passes of Afghanistan; he thought similar tactics 
would work against the United States. Technologically, militarily, and numerically 
inferior, bin Laden recognized the very real need to embrace guerilla tactics and fear as a 




Laden believed he would invoke the same helpless fear the mechanized Soviet forces felt 
as they battled a more fluid, deceptive, and agile force in the Panshir Valley of 
Afghanistan.   
In August of 1998, bin Laden and his surrogates in Kenya and Tanzania struck the 
embassies of the United States in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, respectively. These near 
simultaneous actions killed hundreds of people, mostly Muslim. These attacks ushered in 
the age of al-Qa’ida and bin Laden’s control of the organization. The U.S. response to 
this attack was muddled, ineffective, and untimely which further emboldened bin Laden’s 
belief that his campaign of fear would have the effect he desired, which was compliance 
with his 1996 fatwa.  
Even though diplomatic pressure was being brought against the Sudan to expel 
bin Laden and turn him over to the United States, bin Laden was already planning his 
next act that culminated in the attack against the USS Cole in the Port of Aden, Yemen in 
late October of 2000. When a skiff loaded with explosive rammed the U.S. destroyer as it 
was being refueled in Aden’s Harbor killing 17 U.S. sailors and wounding many more, 
the FBI and CIA were already painfully aware of a near-crippling communication 
problem between the agencies. Again, bin Laden was clearly emboldened by the U.S. 
reaction to this direct attack on the American military.  In fact, there was no response at 
all.  It is clear this lack of a military response coupled with the ineffective counterattack 
to the U.S. Embassy bombings two years prior was pivotal in bin Laden’s thinking. So 
much so, that as the USS Cole limped back to the United States on the back of a giant 
Dutch sea-hauler, bin Laden began commiserating with another Islamist opportunist 
named Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) to conduct the most horrific attack on U.S. soil 
since Pearl Harbor.   
By 2001, bin Laden had long since departed an increasingly hostile Sudan for the 
safer climes of Afghanistan, entertaining his family and a series of guests that included 
Saudi diplomats and Arab princess.40 From his headquarters at Tarnak Farms in the 
                                                 




Kandahar Province, bin Laden authorized KSM to begin the planning process for the 
attacks of 9/11, the seeds of which had been sown seven years earlier during his 
nephew’s attempted destruction of the World Trade Center in February 1993. FBI 
investigation revealed Ramzi Yousef and several others conspired to topple one tower 
into another by detonating a truck bomb in the subterranean parking garage of the North 
Tower. This plot was largely unsuccessful, but nevertheless resulted in the death of six 
Americans and the wounding of hundreds of others.41 
As the plans to conduct the attacks on 9/11 moved forward, each of the players 
was being personally and psychologically inspired by the inaction of the United States to 
threaten their safe havens.  The strikes against suspected Al-Qaida elements in the Sudan 
in August 1998 as reprisals for the near simultaneous bombings of the U.S. Embassies in 
East Africa proved ineffective and may have served to further embolden bin Laden. This 
relative inaction was further exacerbated by an acrimonious change of Presidential power 
from President William J. Clinton to President George W. Bush.  
September 11, 2001 arrived largely unchallenged, and the disastrous 
consequences of inaction and evil resulted in the deaths of more than 2,900 Americans. 
That day serves an important lesson insofar that directed terrorist actions left 
unchallenged will continually be revisited upon those who have not answered them.  This 
is reminiscent of lessons learned (or in this case not learned) from an old Bedouin tale: 
A Bedouin Chieftain was alerted one day to the theft of some chickens 
from his stock.  He ordered his two sons to find and bring to him his 
chickens and the person responsible for this crime as he knew, as a wise 
Chieftain, that the theft, left unchallenged, would be his ruin.  His sons 
searched (one assumes half-heartedly) for the thief, but returned to their 
father without the culprit.  The father chastising his sons harshly sent his 
sons away.   
Days later the Chieftain was again notified that he had been the victim of 
theft, this time of several camels.  He again called for his sons and told his 
sons to go forth and find not his camels, but his chickens.  Confused, his 
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sons went out and thinking they should look for both, found neither and 
return ashamedly to their father.  The chieftain berated his son’s lack of 
diligence and sent them away again. 
Finally, the Chieftain was awoken by a messenger alerting him that his 
daughter had been raped and murdered.  He brought his sons to his tent 
again and said “it has come to this: my daughter and your sister is dead 
because you could not find my chickens.”42 
This tale tells one that if the United States had reacted appropriately in 1993, or in 
1998, or in 2000, then the destruction wrought by 9/11 could have been averted.  
Unfortunately, relative inaction led the U.S. to, on a national level, what the Bedouin 
chieftain experienced in the raping and murder of his daughter.  Terrorism unchallenged 
ushers in more of it and a greater belief by those conducting it, that theirs is the right 
tactic to achieve their objectives.   
C. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES ABROAD 
How might the FBI adopt or adapt methodologies used by other agencies in 
countries that have been targets of terrorist actions?  When discussing the possibility of 
establishing a domestic intelligence agency for the United States or modifying current 
process by existing agencies, the first thought is to examine the effectiveness of these 
agencies in countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Spain, and even 
India. Of these models, which has been most effective in preventing terrorist attack?  
Which model is more consistently able to provide courtroom admissible evidence to a 
law enforcement agency to further the investigation, conduct the arrest, and present the 
case to their justice departments for prosecution? The data within each country is mixed 
and presents no real evidence that a domestic intelligence agency is more effective than 
the FBI.43  In fact, if numbers of terrorist acts which have occurred in these countries 
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since September 11, 2001 is an indicator of success or deterrence, then an argument could 
be made that these agencies are less effective in the prevention of terrorism than a hybrid 
agency such as the FBI. 
1. The MI-5 Model 
MI-5 was formed in 1909 (one year after the United States formed the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation) as an agency dedicated primarily to the counterespionage 
mission.  With communism on the rise, the agency became fully engaged in the business 
of catching spies and focused little on counterterrorism until the 1970s when MI-5 began 
combating terrorism in Northern Ireland.44  This acquisition of additional responsibilities 
is not unlike the FBI’s experiences in adapting to meet the challenges of new threats 
which is a discussion for a later chapter. 
Unlike the FBI, MI-5 has no powers of arrest, rather they collect intelligence and 
hand it over to the police (police departments such as New Scotland Yard, Greater 
Manchester, etc.) in order for those agencies to open parallel investigations, collect 
evidence, conduct arrests, and present the evidence in court. MI-5 also does not arm its 
officers, nor do they use any form of plea bargaining except during the sentencing phase 
of trial.  It would be inaccurate to say MI-5 does not allow its officers to testify in trial — 
it does have a small cadre of individuals that assist the police and prosecutors in 
testimony, especially on the technical aspects of their collection. 
The role of the service today is to protect the national security and economic well-
being of the United Kingdom and to support the efforts of law enforcement agencies in 
preventing and detecting serious crime.  According to Mr. Paul Smith, the agency has six 
primary objectives: 
1. To frustrate terrorism—both internationally and domestically 
(counterterrorism) 
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2. To prevent foreign intelligence operations and other foreign state activities 
from damaging the UK’s national security interests and economic well-
being (counterintelligence / counterespionage) 
3. To frustrate procurement by proliferating countries of materiel, 
technology, or expertise related to weapons of mass destruction (counter-
proliferation) 
4. To reduce crime by assisting law enforcement agencies in its efforts to 
prevent and detect (serious crime reduction) 
5. To protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of government 
information and assets and the effective operations of the critical 
infrastructure (protective security). The service does this by utilizing what 
they coined as the “Four P’s” 
• Prepare 
• Protect 
• Prevent (Counter-radicalization) 
• Pursue 
6. To identify, provide warning, and counter new or re-emerging threats such 
as subversion45 
a. The Desk Officer 
MI-5 is built around the “desk officer” concept, which is constituted by a 
cadre well-educated, young, and highly motivated officers who totally control the 
collection processes against specific targets. These desk officers, along with the “Special 
Branch” within each police department, generate ideas on how to attack a target — 
whether to utilize human assets or technical coverage. 
When discussing counterterrorism specifically, MI-5 recognizes four types 
of CT investigations:   
• The Long Running Intelligence Investigation 
• The Hot Tip 
                                                 




• The Post Attack 
• The Fluke46 
The chart below (Figure 3) is a visualization of the desk officer concept as 
described by Mr. Paul Smith and the methods by which the desk officer receives 
information and provides taskings to the field for further collection against a target: 
 
Figure 3. Desk Officer Concept 
MI-5 uses several methods to conduct investigations which are not unlike 
those undertaken by intelligence or law enforcement organizations.  Placement of assets 
(HUMINT), surveillance, interception, liaison, data mining, and eavesdropping through 
electronic and mechanical surveillance systems all have their place within the MI-5 
investigative framework.47   
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With respect to electronic surveillance, and unlike the laws protecting U.S. 
persons against unwarranted eavesdropping in the United States, MI-5 needs only 
suspicion to implement collection against a target and does not take the collection request 
to a judge or magistrate, but rather to the Home Secretary who reviews and authorizes the 
surveillance package. In the United States, the FBI must show the target is “an agent of a 
foreign power” (terrorist), demonstrating this through a lengthy application which must 
be sworn before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) by an FBI 
supervisory special agent. These court orders (if granted) are good for a period (typically) 
of 90 days for U.S. persons (USPERS) and up to six months for non USPERS.  MI-5’s 
requests are subject to judicial review every six months by their High Court Judge to 
ensure accuracy and necessity.48 
MI-5 and a law enforcement agency with jurisdiction conduct what they 
call a “dual track” investigation: MI-5 works the intelligence collection portion of the 
case and the law enforcement agency (such as New Scotland Yard) works the criminal 
aspects of the case.  During an arrest or subject interview situation, the MI-5 desk officer 
in charge of collection against the specific target would deploy to the interview location 
to assist the interview team during the interrogation.  In instances such as this and if the 
potential for prosecution exists, New Scotland Yard (NSY) would be responsible for 
taking the criminal case to court. 49 
The agency is broken down into thirds: operations, policy, and finance. In 
terms of size, MI-5 is a relatively small organization with approximately 3,500 
individuals in the service, 55 percent of which are under the age of 40, with the agency 




                                                 






legal and judicial bodies (such as the surveillance applications by the high court judge 
every six months), by Ministerial review, during the surveillance request process, through 
Parliamentary policy, and through Treasury audits.51 
One of the most striking differences between the MI-5 model and the FBI 
is the lack of required predication with regard to surveillance requests on UK subjects. It 
is unlikely the U.S. Congress would craft legislation creating an agency whose 
capabilities would include the authority to conduct relatively unfettered surveillance 
based on nothing more than suspicion. The other primary difference is in the necessity for 
MI-5 to have a law enforcement agency “sponsor” to take criminal actions to court. The 
FBI is a hybrid agency capable of collecting intelligence and taking the evidentiary 
aspects of that collection to court on its own. In instances where intelligence and/or 
evidence is collected through sensitive techniques, the FBI seeks Attorney General “Use 
Authority,” which allows such evidence to be used in open court. Obviously, like MI-5, 
the FBI must weigh the benefits of such use especially in terms of exposing sensitive 
techniques to prosecute the subject of said surveillance.   
2. The British Experience in Northern Ireland   
In the fascinating article written by Matthew Teague for the April 2006 edition of 
The Atlantic Monthly, the author presents a model for collecting and disrupting an 
organization. In this case, the British infiltrated the Irish Republican Army (IRA), 
exploited its weaknesses, and sowed the seeds of mistrust among its members. The 
extraordinary aspect about this methodology was the patience, risk, and the political will 
needed to implement and the ruthless manner in which it was ultimately executed.52 The 
experiences of MI-5 in Northern Ireland provide certain lessons and cautionary tales for 
the United States, the most important of which is how or whether the U.S. should employ 
these techniques, tactics, and procedures in our current struggle against Islamic Fascism.   
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The British created a counterinsurgency task force called the “Force Research 
Unit,” dedicated to the mission of IRA infiltration through the use of undercover 
operatives, bribery, and, subsequent to this, covert assets. Through this trident of 
techniques, the British were able to create mistrust between IRA members and dissolve 
their ability to depend on one another as each feared the other was a British Operative or 
they themselves might be wrongly (or accurately in some cases) labeled as a British spy 
and killed for it.  
For years the British provided funds to sources and undercover agents (UCA’s) 
who were woven so deeply within the IRA they were actually involved in some of the 
most violent tactics the group could execute — many times with the knowledge of the 
handlers who were paying them. The British believed that by doing this, the UCA’s and 
assets who performed these actions (Fulton was a bomb-maker and Scapaticci was a 
ruthless enforcer) could get an increasingly better optic on the organization and could 
provide more prescient intelligence to their handlers — always toward the ultimate goal 
of dismantling the IRA.53 
What separates British actions in Northern Ireland and counter terror operations in 
the United States is the brazenness of the British government’s decision to invest in this 
sort of long-term penetration and doing so despite the risks to British civilian life.  Much 
can be learned through their decision to take the long-view in this struggle and employing 
the tactics they authorized with the understanding that while the short-term tactical risks 
were many, the potential results for taking these risks would be the internal destruction of 
the IRA. 
The British conduct of this counterinsurgency differs from our own government’s 
prosecution of the war on terror in many ways. The United States government will never 
support such actions, nor is it likely willing to risk the lives of innocent civilians (even 
relatively controlled risk) to seek some greater victory in the future. This unwillingness to 
accept risk for long-term gain is understandable, but it is also crippling. To fight an 
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increasingly deadly enemy, the nation must be able to accept risk by employing tactics 
which allows UCA’s to “buy” credibility within their respective cells or subordinate units 
within the larger organization. However, to employ such tactics, there must be a greater 
investment in fully in training undercover operatives to be more technically and tactically 
savvy in order to defeat the checks which are placed on them by their respective terrorist 
organization. By checks, this author suggests that terrorist organizations routinely vet the 
information and actions taken by their members to ensure loyalty and lethality. This 
vetting process is similar to the process the USG uses to ensure the reliability and access 
of embedded assets. 
3. A Culture Devoid of Risk 
In the early years of the Cold War, intelligence organizations managed risk, but 
did so using a much different leadership prism than the one that was used in the decade 
prior to September 11, 2001. This prism was forged through the fire of the exploits 
perpetrated by the special operations soldiers, the FBI’s own intelligence agents, and 
members of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) who parachuted behind enemy lines to 
foment disarray and encourage underground resistance movements. It was also forged 
through leaders who understood the sacrifices that were required to win the long, dark 
struggle of major conflict. 
Unfortunately, the political situation dictated the times and that prism was put 
away after the fall of the Communist Bloc, and by the early 1990s the United States 
began to withdraw from daring exploits and began to focus more on the nation’s 
burgeoning technical prowess to gauge the intent of U.S. enemies.  And while America’s 
major antagonist dissolved, many more were born into existence as the firm hand of 
Communism loosed its grip upon the controls of many third-world nations. It was during 
this time human collectors should have been unleashed upon the disparate, but 
increasingly deadly organizations emerging across the globe.   
Exactly the opposite happened. The U.S. went into a shell of complacency, 




signals and imagery intelligence, could provide all the answers it needed to protect its 
borders and interests abroad. In fact, the Clinton administration acting on this belief 
instituted a policy, called the Torricelli Principle, essentially prohibiting the Central 
Intelligence Agency from recruiting and utilizing assets and informants with a record of 
criminal wrongdoing or civil rights abuses.54 This policy unduly restricted the U.S, 
government’s intelligence agencies in recruiting assets with access to information which 
could have protected it against attack, and, what is worse, created an investigative and 
intelligence collection culture devoid of risk taking and imagination—both of which 
proved devastating in the years leading up to 9/11. 
The British, on the other hand, were still embroiled in their struggle against a 
deadly insurgency but were beginning to see gains from their employment of dangerous, 
cleverly repetitive, and patient undercover operations. Operations, that were they to be 
exposed, would cause catastrophic damage to the parallel, albeit largely ineffective, peace 
process ongoing with Northern Ireland.   
The gamble in Northern Ireland worked; in September 2005, the IRA disbanded 
its armed struggle against British rule and began to get behind the political process led by 
Jerry Adams’ Sinn Fein. As Timothy Lavin writes, “The disarmament was a response to 
many things — progress made by its political wing, Sinn Fein; slackening of American 
funds after 9/11; and the many reforms triggered by the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, 
to name a few. But even as all these events unfolded publicly, in the shadows a 
devastating cancer had metastasized within the IRA's leadership.”55  This cancer was the 
bold emplacement of British agents within the IRA — agents so deeply embedded within 
the organization that they participated in nearly all aspects of the organizations efforts to 
rid British influence from Northern Ireland. By conducting these actions shoulder to 
shoulder with other members, they were inherently trusted, but during it all, they were 
reporting, targeting, and removing the heart of the organization from within.   
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4. 9/11 Forces a New Paradigm 
The attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 finally forced into 
the American conscience the insidious goals of Islamic Fascism even though many 
countries had been targeted for over a decade by terrorist organizations. Americans have 
largely forgotten Beirut in 1983, World Trade Center I in 1993, the Manila Air Plot of the 
mid 1990s, and Khobar Towers and East Africa Embassy Bombings of 1996 and 1998, 
respectively.  And while there are no positives worth the death of nearly 3000 innocent 
lives, the attacks and future threats have forced our government into researching the 
feasibility of using a new operational paradigm in this war against terrorism. As such, the 
U.S. government is contemplating for the first time in decades, the use of riskier 
undercover operations with unsure results — operations that cost political capital as well 
as real capital for the purposes of creating an undercover capacity similar to what was 
used by the British so expertly in their fight against the IRA.   
In the short term at least, U.S. leaders have become more amenable to conducting 
actions which have led to an offensive posture in efforts against terrorist organizations.  
The overt actions are well known: The deployment of U.S. forces in two theaters, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the demonstrated efforts of the Treasury Department in identifying 
and freezing assets owned or even “touched” by terror groups, and the government’s 
non-distinction between terrorists and those who harbor them.   
The CIA and FBI have both recognized the need to increase their respective 
abilities to collect using human assets. This human intelligence capability is the first step 
in building a network of agents and assets with the skills necessary to infiltrate and report 
on terror groups. 
Additionally, the arguments which started immediately after 9/11 and which were 
featured prominently in the 9/11 Commission hearings with respect to “The Wall” 
prohibiting intelligence sharing between intelligence and criminal divisions of the FBI, 
illustrates how far the pendulum had swung and how far back it needed to go in order for 




have passed since 9/11, few if any, have suggested this wall needs to be rebuilt. While 
eliminating the wall may seem a subtle change for most to the way the FBI operated prior 
to 9/11, it has impacted in major way how the FBI investigates and prosecutes terrorist 
cases. 
Within this construct, it is the investigation of these cases that shows the greatest 
sea change within this new template. Prior to 9/11 and even for several years afterward, 
the FBI was culturally averse to allowing investigations to linger if a threat was implied. 
This was a direct result of two things: 1) in the years just prior to 9/11 the nation was 
lulled into a complacency which created a political environment which disallowed 
creative, but potentially risky, investigations; and 2) immediately after 9/11, the FBI, in 
particular, and the USG writ large were so totally focused on the prevention of another 
act that every subject of investigative interest that had verbalized threats (and where 
adequate evidence was obtained) was disrupted This is not a failure on the part of 
leadership, but simply a reflexive reaction to the unprecedented acts perpetrated against 
the United States. Since that time, however, the intelligence agencies and leaders have 
begun to readdress the thought processes that brought the IC to this methodology and 
have begun to step back from the focus on disruption, giving way to an emphasis on 
collection. 
Especially for the FBI, an organization built around the foundation of criminal 
investigations, arrests, and prosecutions, this new shift or paradigm embracing lengthy 
intelligence gathering investigations prior to a disruption or arrest is a major change in 
U.S. culture. This shift has dramatically changed the day-to-day operations of the FBI 
and is another step toward understanding the benefits of long-term collection versus the 
short-term victory of an arrest or disruption before true exploitation of the subject’s 
organization could occur. This maturation process will only continue and as the public 
conscience becomes more aware of the forces aligned against the country, one can 
assume the USG is more likely to consider the very real possibility of engaging in the 




Clearly the use of prolonged and politically charged operations will be a source of 
much debate by the government in the months and years to come. To paraphrase 
Matthew Teague when asked by Timothy Lavin whether his story about the British 
dismantlement of the IRA has any moral implications for the United States against its 
battle with the Iraqi Insurgency, Teague puts it like this:  
That's the heart of this story, I think. It's about us, as much as it's about the 
British. I suspect that in the short-term infiltration works, in that it helps 
you penetrate and undermine a specific organization, whether it is the IRA 
or Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Long-term, the methods of penetration are so 
duplicitous that you create a terrible perception of yourself. For instance, 
the British did penetrate the IRA and they did undermine it through 
duplicity. But everything comes out in the end. Denis Donaldson, for 
instance, all of these decades later, is revealed to be a spy and it 
undermines all of the work that the British have done. And so it is a 
quandary — it really is.56 
Only time will tell how far the pendulum will swing before U.S. government 
actions find the right level in this war against terror. How much intrigue and violence will 
the nation’s soul have to bear, before those actions begin to meld imperceptibly with 
those who the fight is against? There is a level at which the nation can strike an optimum 
benefit between the aspects of infiltration, collection, and exploitation without risking the 
loss of the primary objective which is to safeguard the American people and preserve the 
rights they have as citizens.  
                                                 




IV. PROGRESS TO DATE 
A. STRATEGIC EXECUTION TEAM AND INTELLIGENCE BASED 
DECISION MAKING 
One internal criticism often heard within the FBI is that as an organization, “the 
FBI does not systematically use intelligence to drive decision making.”57 This concern is 
being addressed by implementing what the FBI calls the “Strategic Execution Team” to 
train the force and establish a culture based, not coincidentally, on “Intelligence-Based 
Decision Making.” While not an original concept, it nonetheless underscores the bureau’s 
efforts to identify the threat landscape, paint the situational template of potential enemy 
actors, and action those threats based on a balance of intelligence collection and 
prosecution/neutralization.   
The SET process is a key piece of transformational doctrine directing the 
institutional changes within the FBI. SET is an acronym used to describe a cultural shift 
in the FBI’s focus to create an organization capable of meeting the domestic intelligence 
needs of the United States in the twenty-first century. 
The intelligence-based, decision-making concept likely began within the 
intelligence branches of the military as battlefield commanders understood early on that 
to be successful, there was, and remains, a paramount need for “timely and accurate 
intelligence and information to plan and execute operations across the continuum of 
operations to ensure mission accomplishment while minimizing risk.”58 The same is true 
for law enforcement and intelligence organizations insofar as both types of agencies need 
accurate and timely intelligence to counter criminal and national security threats against 
the homeland. Even localized law enforcement has embraced the idea of intelligence led 
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policing that was borne out of the military’s belief that a thorough understanding of the 
battlefield is required to meet with and effectively destroy the enemy. 
To this end, the FBI has developed a rigorous schedule to introduce the “SET” 
process to each of the 56 field offices around the country.  These SET teams deploy to the 
field office and, over the course of several weeks, conduct SET training sessions first 
with the division leadership, then the supervisory personnel, and, finally, the agent and 
analytical population to educate all levels on the shift the FBI is taking to focus resources 
on the threats that face the United States in the twenty-first century. 
B. THE MILITARY: A TEMPLATE FOR TRANSFORMATIONAL 
CHANGE? 
One of the fundamental processes designed to ensure the FBI is changing its 
historical “reactive” criminal focus to a more “predictive” intelligence driven 
organization is by implementing a “Domain Awareness” campaign.   
1. Predictive Intelligence—A Military Lesson 
The domain awareness concept is a process whereby each field office conducts a 
thorough examination of its territory similar to what the United States Army calls 
“intelligence preparation of the battlefield” or IPB. This domain awareness process will 
be used to understand how current threats (sometimes in the form of pending cases), 
coupled with demographics, intelligence collection requirements, and emerging threats 
blend together to form a complete picture of the “domain” in order to position 
investigative resources to counter the threats and produce a “predictive intelligence” 
capability to better safeguard the homeland. The domain roughly equals what the U.S. 
Army intelligence officers refer to as the “enemy situation,” which provides them and 
their combatant commanders an illustrative view of where the threats exist and how best 
to align friendly forces on the battlefield to defeat them.   
Unfortunately, establishing the existence and likely location of the threat is only 




these enemy forces will act—what course of action will they take against the United 
States, and how will the FBI use this predictive intelligence to defeat the threat before the 
act occurs. 
A predictive intelligence capability starts with intelligence preparation of the field 
division’s territory (domain awareness) and then shifts into the realm of understanding 
the doctrine by which the enemy, in this case, terrorist groups and criminal enterprises, 
traditionally use to perpetrate their acts. Admittedly, the FBI has not been strong in 
developing doctrine for groups which they have investigated, but relied rather on a 
culture of tribal wisdom passed down from case agent to case agent. While this has 
proven effective in the fight against more traditional crimes, it is not a suitable way to 
address the deadly threats currently faced by the United States.   
The FBI must establish a doctrinal, albeit malleable, template, similar to those 
used by the U.S. Military, for the enemies faced by the United States today. This template 
has proven to be successful time and again when used by military intelligence officers 
who use their knowledge of enemy doctrine to predict how the enemy will fight on the 
battlefield and how friendly forces and terrain can by used to exploit weaknesses.  The 
enemy doctrine must then be layered over the territory to more fully understand the 
constraints terrain, weather, and, finally, friendly forces will have on the way the enemy 
chooses to fight.  From this layering of doctrine, intelligence preparation of the battlefield 
(domain awareness), and enemy capabilities (or what the military calls “Order of 
Battle”), terrain, weather, and, finally, friendly force capabilities, comes the prediction of 
enemy courses of action (COA).   
These predictive COAs emerged through a deliberate planning process and 
thorough understanding of the enemy. From these COAs comes a process called “course 
of action analysis” whereby the intelligence officer names each COA as “Least Likely,” 
“Most Likely,” or “Most Dangerous.” The intelligence officer briefs the combatant 
commander on why he or she chose them in that way and defends his or her position 





to accept the intelligence officer’s analysis or can modify it based on experience and then 
array friendly forces in a way that effectively exploits the enemy’s weaknesses for 
greatest impact. 
The FBI also must develop doctrine for terrorist groups and use that doctrinal 
template in conjunction with the steps listed above to confront the enemy using predictive 
methods as opposed to reacting to an act and finding clues to arrest the perpetrator after 
the damage is done. SET is attempting to make the case that the FBI will use intelligence 
to do just that although little has been said to date about the use of doctrine to support this 
effort. Time will tell whether the FBI will see the utility in creating doctrinal templates of 
enemy capabilities and tactics so that the agents and analysts can understand how to 
confront and defeat criminal and terrorist enterprises.   
2. Military Transformation as a Roadmap for Success 
This thesis speaks of the FBI’s development into a domestic intelligence 
organization as a “transformation.”  The term transformation is used to describe a major 
change in organizational philosophy and a commitment to conducting operations, change 
that the FBI intends to accomplish by incorporating the strategic execution concept. But 
the FBI is far from having a monopoly on transformative processes; in fact, the FBI has 
never been particularly adept at wholesale major change, which, in this case, gives more 
credence to the use of the term transformation when describing this subtle 
metamorphosis.   
It is impossible to discuss organizational transformation within the U.S. 
government and not address the challenges faced by the Department of Defense. Whether 
it is prompted by a need for new technologies and war-fighting equipment, changes to the 
historical threat landscape, or the sudden appearance of new and unprecedented dangers, 
the Department of Defense planners, government contractors, and private consortiums are 
constantly working to shape the force for conflicts both near-term and for generations 




Andrew Krepinevich articulated this description of military transformation 
in testimony for the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2002 
when he was Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments: Transformation can be thought of as innovation on a grand 
scale.  Transformation is undertaken by a military that believes major 
changes are occurring in the character of conflict.  Periods of military 
transformation are typically associated with a revolution in military 
affairs, or an RMA, in which a combination of technology, war-fighting 
concepts, and organizational change combine to bring about a dramatic 
leap in military effectiveness. 
Militaries are motivated to transform most often because they conclude 
either that very different operational challenges are arising that will greatly 
reduce the effectiveness of existing forces, or because they see an 
opportunity to develop new forms of operations themselves that will yield 
great advantage in future military competitions.59 
Transformation as “innovation” is an interesting way to look at the hard problems 
that arise when instituting major change in an organization. By attaching the term 
innovation to corporate or government change, it gives the perception that an 
organization is abandoning the old to adapt to a new, more vital process by which the 
agency believes it can accomplish its mission. In the FBI’s case, simply removing the 
tendency to focus on a single-minded approach to investigations, which for years has 
been arrests, indictments, and prosecutions, in favor of a more balanced strategy of 
targeting, collection, exploitation, and disruption, qualifies as innovative. This may seem 
subtle to the casual observer, but to change the mindset of an organization which, over 
time, has become increasingly focused on the law enforcement option into one that must 
first focus on collection is, indeed, transformative. 
In Krepinevich’s testimony, he describes the military’s need to transform based 
on the documented rise of “anti-access/anti-denial threats,” as well as “nontraditional 
forms of attack” against the homeland.60 Krepinevich contends, as do others, that the 
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United States will face increasing anti-access and denial operations from countries 
around the globe as most recently witnessed in offensive operations in Afghanistan.  
Krepinevich reminds one that while public sentiment was vastly in favor of American 
military operations in retaliation for the Al-Qa’ida attacks on September 11, 2001, it did 
not translate to open access to forward bases from which to launch strikes against the 
Taliban. Given the great strength of the U.S. military is the ability to project power 
around the globe, this denial of access to forward bases seriously erodes the nation’s 
ability to conduct military operations abroad.61 
A critically important takeaway from Krepinevich’s testimony comes from his 
key question, “Why transform the world’s best military?” This question has been asked 
of the FBI: Why transform the world’s premier law enforcement organization? 
Krepinevich believes that the threats that face the United States today are vastly different 
than those of the Cold War and merely improving the current capabilities of the force will 
be insufficient to meet these vast challenges.62 The same is true for the FBI. Simply 
improving the bureau’s ability to identify, locate, and arrest perpetrators post-incident 
will not do. The bureau must take dead-aim at terrorist organizations, criminal 
enterprises, and foreign intelligence threats proactively using a predictive intelligence 
capacity to target, collect, exploit, report, arrest, and potentially recruit subjects of 
terrorism or criminal enterprises.    
C. PRIORITIZATION AND DOMAIN AWARENESS 
1. Priority versus Threats 
Another aspect of the SET process is the issue of priority and how field offices 
rank the threats within their territories. Each field office has ranked terrorism as the 
number one priority to reflect the national priorities of the FBI. In remarks made to the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police in November of 2008, FBI Director Robert 
                                                 





Mueller noted after commenting about the FBI’s commitment to improving the 
cornerstones of the intelligence function, “…We did all this in service of our highest 
mission—preventing terrorism.  That remains the FBI’s number one priority and it is not 
going to change.”63 Implementation of the SET process may actually soften that mandate 
to more accurately reflect the nature of the threat landscape in each division, allowing the 
SAC of the field office to appropriate investigative resources to address the greatest 
concern to the area’s citizenry.   
While the priorities of the FBI are not changing, individual field offices are now 
required to rank the top three threats as understood by each division after conducting a 
thorough domain assessment. These threats are not required to be solely about terrorism, 
and although most are, there is a noticeable rise of violent crime, mortgage fraud, public 
corruption, and foreign counterintelligence issues, which are vying for investigative 
action.  Given the resurgence of criminal matters in many of the field offices around the 
country, another change having a positive impact on limited FBI resources is the policy 
which now allows the field office to factor in the credibility and triage threats, thereby 
limiting the necessity to deploy agents to investigate the ubiquitous Usama Bin Laden 
sightings at the local convenience store or the “suspicious male” taking pictures of a city 
bridge. As the FBI and local police agencies become more experienced addressing 
threats, agents and police officers are “weeding out” threats which have no merit before 
they become a drain on resources which are addressing those threats and cases which 
have more significant credibility rating.     
The overarching objectives of the SET process will enable each of the FBI’s 56 
field offices to use internal analytical and agent personnel assigned to the organic Field 
Intelligence Group to create products for use by the field office as a whole and for the 
operational or investigative squads in particular. Additionally, these squads will use these 
products to create a common operational picture and address the national collection 
requirements as established by the intelligence community and the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence (ODNI). This process will then fulfill an additional objective of 
                                                 




establishing a regular cycle for “intelligence-related interaction and information flow” 
between the FIG which conducts longer term analysis and the investigative squads which 
collect on and “action” the target.64 
The SET concept of using intelligence-related information to drive decision 
making will impact a field office on several fronts: first, it will enable a field office (FO) 
to divert resources to the most legitimate and highest priority threats; second, it will allow 
the FO to address threats early in their development; and third, it will enable the FO to 
refocus limited resources immediately after a threat is addressed or determined to be 
insignificant.65   
The decision to address certain threats or focusing resources on specific priorities 
is not based on guesswork but rather on knowing that the facts support the resource 
allocation effort.66 This process allows the SAC (much like a battlefield commander) to 
align his or her forces to face the most likely course of action as opposed to reacting to all 
threats with equal weight, thereby reducing the effectiveness and force of the 
investigative response. 
As a way to ensure field offices are monitoring their domains and threats 
accordingly, the director is chairing quarterly sessions with each field office’s leadership 
to review the top three threats as proposed by the office and to ask questions about why 
the SAC and his or her staff ranked the threats in such a manner. In these sessions, the 
SAC will be faced with the following questions:  
1. What are the most important threats?  
2. How is the field office addressing those known threats?  
3. What are the territory’s emerging threats?  
4. How is the field office addressing the emerging threats? 
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5. What are the highest priorities when factoring in standing, local, and ad 
hoc requirements? 
6. What are the office’s capabilities, speed, and confidence? 
7. What are the most critical intelligence gaps and plan of attack to address 
these?67  
2. National Security Tools Apply to Criminal Threats 
During Director Mueller’s speech to the International Chiefs of Police in 
November 2008, he made an important point about a byproduct of the FBI’s efforts in 
utilizing new tools to address national security threats—they apply to criminal matters as 
well.68 Many of the technological advances agents and analysts have used to address 
terrorism threats will also directly support agents and local law enforcement working 
criminal investigations. This was heartening news to the chiefs whose local departments 
are beset by an increasingly violent criminal element and are struggling to keep 
neighborhoods from falling sway to gangs and drugs. 
As an example, the director commented about the use of geospatial mapping 
technology as a way to visually track crime data from multiple agencies to gain a clear 
picture of the domain. This technology will allow investigators and analysts see acts of 
crime, source activity locations, points of interest in open investigations, outstanding 
warrants, etc. This tool allows agencies to compare crime data to a multitude of other 
investigative data to reveal connections in a visual way which is a much more productive 
way to digest information and make decisions about the deployment of resources.69 
Another way to exploit the experiences gained in national security investigations 
for use in a criminal capacity is the concurrent task force approach. The director used the 
Chicago Field Office as an example of how this works: the FBI typically uses an 
“Enterprise Theory” of investigations to attack organizations from the top down, but 
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given the level of street violence associated with specific gangs, a special, tactical task 
force was formed to address the lower-level gang violence at the same time while other 
squads were working on dismantling the leadership. Given that low-level criminals are 
not “rolled-up” when the leadership is targeted, it was essential that a squad was created 
to address the immediate violent arm of the organization and do so in a way that did not 
impact the long-term investigations of the leadership.70   
This idea has been used to great effect by the U.S. military in Iraq and 
Afghanistan as military planners have learned that simply removing leaders from 
organizations is ineffective. Great success has been achieved, however, by 
simultaneously attacking leadership and foot soldiers, leaving massive gaps in the 
enemy’s force structure making it impossible to repair in the short-term and much more 
difficult to replicate in the future.  
D. THE MI-5 EXPERIENCE AND FIG CONSTRUCT 
The FBI has learned valuable lessons from its dealings with the British Security 
Service. Nevertheless, the FBI has taken steps to strengthen the role of intelligence 
analysts both as strategic thinkers, but also as embedded support within the investigative 
squads. The FBI has created a Field Intelligence Group, which will be the backbone of 
the every field office’s intelligence and analytical program. FIGs were instituted shortly 
after September 11, 2001 in an effort to synthesize the intelligence being collected by the 
bureau, but field offices were given wide latitude when creating their respective FIG, 
resulting in radically different missions and understanding of the exact role the cell 
should play within the division. As a result, FIG products were often not applicable to the 
problem set faced by the field office, but focused on more strategic problems already 
being addressed by FBIHQ analytical units and other agencies within the intelligence 
community. This disconnect led to early discontent within the field offices about the 
utility of their FIG and the overhead it took to staff it. 
                                                 




SET seeks to rectify this process and institute three standardized FIG 
organizations based on the size of the offices: small, medium, or large. Within the FIG is 
where the analytical core functions, not entirely dissimilar to the desk officer concept 
employed by MI-5. The substantial difference in this case, however, is that FIG analysts 
will not “direct” the case agent; rather, the FIG analyst will suggest collection strategies 
to the investigative squads and provide intelligence collection requirements to address 
with sources during routine debriefings. This interaction will occur routinely through a 
dialogue between the investigative squad’s supervisor, the intelligence analyst, the FIG 
supervisor, and the case agent. 
E. THE HUMAN SOURCE CONUNDRUM 
The FBI, without a doubt, has one of the most impressive human source 
capabilities in the United States intelligence community. With over 16,000 human 
sources, the FBI collects reams of information from source debriefings every day.  
Unfortunately, the FBI also consumes a large majority of its own intelligence, so much so 
that some estimates believe it may be upwards of 85 percent. If this number is accurate, it 
means only 15 percent of the intelligence gathered by the FBI is making its way into 
broader intelligence community channels. Exploiting this intelligence is a primary 
objective of the SET process.  Major efforts are being made to ensure agents, through the 
focused assistance of the embedded analysts on the investigative squads and from the 
FIG, are making their respective sources think beyond the narrow parameters of their 
field office level cases. To do this, agents are tasking their sources with national level 
intelligence requirements that he or she might potentially address based on the source’s 
nationality, ethnicity, or other professional or social connectivity. 
Exposing local sources to national level requirements will enable the FBI to more 
fully exploit the collection potential of the source and meet the needs of the intelligence 
community. Furthermore, it may prove to increase the domain awareness picture of the 
FBI at home as the source exposes additional linkages not known before. To further 




sources to report across multiple programs. This cross-programmatic reporting acts as a 
force multiplier as one source can sometimes report on criminal activity, corruption, and 
foreign counterintelligence simultaneously.  
F. JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCES—A FORCE MULTIPLIER 
Long before 9/11 or even the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, the FBI saw 
terrorism as a future threat to the homeland.  In 1980, the first Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF) was established within the FBI’s New York Field Office. The JTTF was 
established to counter a growing, but nascent threat of terrorism around the globe.  As 
agents from the FBI and detectives from the New York City Police Department began to 
coordinate their investigative actions of terrorist subjects, it became apparent that the 
combination of federal and local capabilities toward a single-minded goal was the 
solution to competing interests and to the hue and cry against the FBI for what was 
perceived as a reluctance to share information with outside agencies.   
What began as an ad hoc group of twenty odd federal and local investigators in 
New York City has grown to a nationwide web of over 4,000 JTTF personnel all 
dedicated toward the same, single-minded goal: to eradicate the threat of terrorism from 
the United States. The JTTF is a highly publicized facet of the FBI’s role in the battle 
against terrorism. It’s also one of its most successful. The JTTF and the informational 
exchange body, borne out of it known as the Counterterrorism Executive Board (CTEB), 
have had an enormous impact on the FBI’s ability to combat terror. The CTEB is 
comprised of the ranking leadership of the agencies which have dedicated personnel to 
the JTTF and other agency leaders as necessary by region. The CTEB provides both the 
FBI and the participating agency leaders an opportunity to exchange information and 
provide updates to the board on the progress of terrorism related cases and initiatives 




1. History, Facts, and Figures 
The FBI established the first Joint Terrorism Task Force in 1980 within the New 
York Field Office.71  Even in those early days of fighting terror, the FBI realized they 
needed assistance from the front line officers working the streets day in and day out.  
Bringing state and local law enforcement investigators into the FBI’s offices started a 
new era of information sharing and partnership that would become a model for our 
current Joint Terrorism Task Forces which are operational in every one of the FBI’s 56 
field offices nationwide and in many smaller satellite offices as well.   
Currently, the FBI JTTF’s have expanded their ranks to almost 4,000 
investigators. Approximately 2,100 of these are FBI special agents, over 800 state and 
local task force officers (TFOs), and almost 700 agents and analysts from other federal 
agencies.  This total is more than four times the amount of personnel the task forces had 
prior to September 11, 2001 and is evidence of the commitment among all the agencies 
participating.72 
While this was a giant step forward in law enforcement and intelligence sharing, a 
second, equally vital step was necessary to ensure the collective “buy in” of the agencies 
contributing personnel to this effort. In 2004, the FBI mandated that each field office 
JTTF institute a Counterterrorism Executive Board comprising the top leadership of 
every agency contributing personnel to the JTTF. In this way, the FBI can advise the 
agency heads of ongoing investigations within their respective areas of responsibility 
(AOR) and ensure information and intelligence obtained as a result of these 
investigations was being passed to the very decision makers charged with the duty of 
protecting their respective constituencies. As a result of this mandate, the FBI has 
ensured that each agency has the most time sensitive and locally focused terrorism 
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information available as well as providing each leader an overview of the current 
counterterrorism efforts across the nation and around the world.   
2. CTEB Information Exchange 
Counterterrorism Executive Boards were also given appropriate opportunities to 
provide operational input about how to address specific threats.73  Each CTEB establishes 
the frequency by which these meetings will occur.  In most field offices, these meetings 
occur monthly, but in other offices, less impacted by active terrorism investigations, the 
meetings may take place no less than quarterly. Threat information developed by the FBI 
special agents, intelligence analysts, and task force officers is routinely provided to the 
members of Executive Boards to make them aware of the most recent intelligence and to 
assist them in their decision-making processes regarding the appropriate response and/or 
involvement by their agencies on a local level. 
Another critically important function of the CTEB’s is to ensure each agency head 
understands the work his or her personnel are doing within the framework of the FBI’s 
investigative mandate.  Prior to the formation of these CTEB’s, many leaders were 
unsure how their personnel were being utilized in the JTTF’s and whether they were 
receiving any benefit from these assignments.  During the CTEB meetings, however, 
these department heads see the full return of their investment as their officers provide 
briefings and current intelligence detailing the extent of their agency’s involvement via 
their dedicated task force personnel. 
Another aspect of the CTEB is that it provides the FBI specifically and the 
intelligence community writ large the assurance in knowing critical intelligence 
information is being shared with local, state, and tribal leaders.  The FBI is ever 
cognizant of the criticisms of by others within and outside the law enforcement 
community about not sharing information and this mechanism ensures these criticisms 
are addressed. 
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3. CTEB Mandates 
In a communication to all field offices in August of 2004, FBI headquarters 
identified the need to capture and highlight the activities of the JTTF Executive Boards.  
With respect to this topic, FBIHQ provided the following guidance to the field: 
• JTTF Executive Boards should meet on an as-needed basis, but at a 
minimum, three times per year.    
• Each meeting should be documented. 
• JTTF Executive Boards may be comprised of key federal, state, local and 
tribal law enforcement officials, but at a minimum, should include the 
heads of law enforcement agencies which have full-time agents and/or 
officers assigned to the JTTF(s) within the field office territory. 
• All board members should maintain a SECRET or TOP SECRET 
security clearance to facilitate the dissemination of classified threat 
information. 
• Assistant Directors in Charge/Special Agents in Charge should maintain a 
system for notifying board members after normal business hours, and on 
weekends, of fast-breaking threat information.  
A critical takeaway from the above guidance is the issuance of clearances to the 
leadership of those departments dedicating personnel to the JTTF.  The FBI, through the 
U.S. government’s Central Clearance Facility has granted over 4,000 secret and top-
secret security clearances to law enforcement executives and JTTF members so they have 
access to the classified information they need to protect their communities. Given the cost 
of a background investigation needed to issue such clearances can be as much as $65,000, 
it is undeniable the FBI has invested huge monetary resources in fulfilling the obligation 
of ensuring the nation’s law enforcement leaders are engaged and have access to critical, 
classified information.74 
                                                 




4. The National Joint Terrorism Task Force 
As a means to provide leadership and administrative guidance to the increasing 
number of JTTF’s throughout the United States, the FBI formed the National Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) at FBIHQ in 2002.75  The primary mission of the FBI is 
to ensure each JTTF is not running independently but working in concert and with a 
standardized set a business practices. Additionally, as stated on the FBI’s website, the 
role of the NJTTF is “Managing the Bureau’s JTTF's around the country…there are 
currently more than 4,000 JTTF task force members from over 600 state and local 
agencies as well as 50 federal agencies.”76 NJTTF Unit Chief Greg Massa further defines 
the role as this, “We support each task force in every way imaginable—from sharing 
intelligence and terrorism threat information to providing big-picture terrorism 
analysis…from offering guidance and oversight to setting sound program policies…from 
supplying resources for manpower, equipment, and space to facilitating training.”77 
While the NJTTF does not provide program management of counterterrorism 
cases in the field offices (this role is left to the Counterterrorism Division’s Operations 
Branch I, International Terrorism Operations Sections One and Two), it does support the 
JTTF’s directly through providing invaluable points of contact for members of local 
JTTF’s to their senior representatives on the NJTTF. Additionally, with the move of CTD 
from FBIHQ to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in McLean, Virginia, the 
NJTTF (which moved there as well) has access to the most current, complete, and 
actionable intelligence within the U.S. government and can share this information with 
JTTF’s throughout the country. Information of this type, which impacts specific regions 
within the United States, can be shared with members of the CTEB to give those decision 
makers information they need to assist in the fight against terrorism. 
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5. Homeland Security Challenges and Collaborative Solutions 
Pivotal to the success of the JTTF writ large and CTEB process, in particular, is 
the effectiveness of the information exchange at these monthly or quarterly events.  The 
exchange must be fostered on a mutual concern for the priorities, but even deeper, the 
FBI leadership and the leaders of the various agencies comprising the CTEB must 
honestly represent to each other their concerns and foster an open dialogue between the 
agencies in the round.  The CTEB meeting should almost always involve the presentation 
of current investigations and future initiatives and these presentations must be 
informative, rich in detail, and pertinent to a concern, which has direct impact on the 
regional area of operations.  These presentations must have defined goals and objectives 
and investigative counsel should be sought from the veteran audience.  The FBI hosts 
would be wise to remember the members have been vested with a costly and binding 
security clearance and should exploit this clearance to ensure the members are taking 
away valuable information that they can use to target their patrols and sources in an effort 
to thwart attack or collect vital intelligence. 
The CTEB members should be reminded that they, too, have a responsibility to 
provide the JTTF information about what their agencies are seeing and hearing from their 
daily interactions with the public and these leaders must ensure their “ground troops” are 
reporting this information to their representative on the JTTF.  Without this notification, 
the JTTF and CTEB will ultimately prove ineffective and the force-multiplier concept of 
the embedded task force officers will be lost.  Too often and unnecessarily, agency heads 
become frustrated by their lack of understanding and awareness of what their dedicated 
JTTF personnel are doing and further, what cases are being worked which impact their 
jurisdictions. A primary reason for this frustration is that the agency head delegated down 
his or her role on the CTEB to a subordinate, and, subsequently, that person fails to 
address the pertinent issues at the meeting and then does a further disservice by not fully 
briefing up the results of the meeting or not briefing at all.  While this is not the majority 
within the CTEB, it presents a large enough problem that it can adversely impact smaller 




participating investigator or analyst from the JTTF even further isolating them from 
pertinent threat and case-related terrorism information.   
Local politics, access to information, and clearance issues recently drove a wedge 
between the FBI and the city of Portland.  In late April of 2005, the city council of 
Portland, Oregon voted to remove its two Portland city police officers from the JTTF.  
This council decision was supported by the mayor, Tom Potter who was a former 
Portland Police Chief and who had not received a Top Secret Clearance, which would 
have allowed him to properly oversee the activities of the officers on the JTTF.  The 
mayor went on further to say, “When we look at our history, we see examples that when 
we blindly give people power, that sometimes the power is misused.”78 In more than 100 
other cities that have JTTFs, these kinds of concerns have never emerged.79 
One other issue that has presented difficulties within the JTTF’s is the inability of 
Task Force Officers from state and local agencies to be properly evaluated by their first 
line supervisor. Typically, a Task Force Officer has a direct supervisor in his or her 
parent department, which is not a member of the JTTF and, therefore, has not been 
granted a security clearance. Clearly, it would be cost prohibitive and unwieldy to 
provide Top Secret Clearances for every member of the member officer’s chain of 
command, but this presents a problem when the supervisor conducts his or her annual 
evaluation of the officer’s performance.   
By all accounts, Counterterrorism Executive Boards have provided the FBI a 
critical venue by which to share time sensitive intelligence and threat information to FBI 
partners in state, local, and tribal law enforcement. The core of this project is to ensure 
the hard and dangerous work of intelligence collectors and terrorism investigators is  
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shared with law enforcement leaders across the country and through this multi-
organizational approach, this sharing of information clearly compounds the nation’s 
ability to protect itself against terror.   
G. INCREASING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES 
Over the last seven years, the FBI has increased the number of specialized 
sections and units at headquarters to address areas that were either understaffed or non-
existent prior to September 11, 2001. One of these newly created units is the 
Counterterrorism Watch or “CT Watch.” CT Watch is a 24/7, 365-day a year unit, which 
stood up to act as the intake for all threats coming into the FBI through a myriad of 
sources.   
CT Watch is linked to all of the FBI offices electronically through normal FBI 
systems and through a database named “Guardian.” Guardian is the database into which 
all terrorism threats are loaded for tracking and review by FBIHQ and the field office 
responsible for addressing the threat. CT Watch also monitors all intelligence community 
reporting and immediately notifies FBI leadership and field offices in the event a threat is 
received. CT Watch also acts as an “after hours” investigative staff conducting 
investigative research for use by investigators when they arrive into the office or receive 
the threat. 
Attacking an enemy’s ability to move and access funds was the genesis for 
creating the Terrorism Financing Operations Section (TFOS) within Counterterrorism 
Division. TFOS is broken down into multiple units addressing specific terror groups 
resulting in a cadre of very experienced investigators and financial analysts who know 
their target groups and the methods those groups use to move funds in support of terrorist 
acts.  TFOS works closely with the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) and State Department to designate groups as terror organizations based 
on a group’s association with tainted funds and their knowledge of what those funds are 




TFOS also works closely with foreign governments who lack the forensic 
financial tools used by the FBI and this partnership is critical to stopping the flow of 
funds overseas in locales difficult to access. In response, these governments have 
enlightened the FBI in ways money is moved without legitimate banking systems such as 
“hawalas,” which are based on a voice-trust system of “hawaladars” who receive and 
lend money based on known associations. 
The Counterterrorism Internet Targeting Team is another recent creation within 
Counterterrorism Division which specifically targets the proliferation of jihadist 
propaganda on the internet and attempts to stop the destructive spread of information 
concerning bomb-making technologies, attack planning, and other criminal uses of the 
internet by terrorist groups. CITU works jointly with members of the IC to target those 
organizations using the internet to radicalize and influence others to commit acts of 
violence. 
In 2002, the FBI created the “Fly Team,” which is an asset totally organic to 
Counterterrorism Division and provides CTD the capability to “force project” 
investigators into field offices needing assistance or foreign countries requesting 
immediate FBI assistance.  Fly Team Special Agents are specially trained and have an 
enhanced survivability aspect that makes possible their deployment to inhospitable areas.  
Trained in the use of state of the art biometrics collection platforms, languages, and 
evidentiary collection techniques in battlefield conditions, the Fly Team is a critical 
component of the FBI’s partnership with military forces around the world. 
Databases such as the “Guardian Threat Tracking System” and the recently 
released “eGuardian” system are addressing a demonstrated need to input, assign, 
investigate, track, and mitigate threats across the entire FBI.  The Guardian system allows 
an agent, task force officer, or analyst from any FBI office to input incoming threat 
information and assign it to the appropriate user whether it is within that field office or 
any of the other offices or legal attaché officers throughout the world.  These threats are 
monitored by the field office, CT Watch, and the Threat Monitoring Unit within 




new eGuardian system is a replica of the successful Guardian database, but it is for use 
by state, local, tribal, and other federal partners who can input threat information into a 
shared database for use by the FBI and fusion centers. The key to this system is the 
linkage it builds between the Joint Terrorism Task Forces and fusion centers with other 
state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners.80 
Another way the FBI is transforming the workforce is by creating agent and 
analyst career development programs as required by the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004. As stated in the act:  
The Director shall —  
(A) establish career positions in national intelligence matters for agents, 
analysts, and related personnel of the Bureau; and 
(B) in furtherance of the requirement under subparagraph 
(A) and to the maximum extent practicable, afford agents, analysts, and 
related personnel of the Bureau the opportunity to work in the career 
specialty selected by such agents, analysts, and related personnel over 
their entire career with the Bureau.81 
To fulfill this requirement, the FBI’s Human Resource Division (HRD) works 
with “substantive divisions” to develop career path plans and associated training for both 
agents and analysts to ensure they obtain the training and experiences they need to 
succeed throughout their careers. For FBI special agents, HRD has developed a four-
stage process, which begins at an agent’s entry level position of GS-10 through his or her 
“journeyman” rank of GS-13. Stage one begins during an agent's training as a trainee at 
the FBI Academy and ensures agents are given extensive training in both criminal and 
national security matters. Stage two begins after the agent’s graduation from New Agent 
Training throughout his or her probationary agent period. In this stage, new agents are 
assigned a variety of required on the job tasks covering the entire spectrum of agent 
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responsibilities. A probationary agent must accomplish these required tasks to be 
removed from probation and also begins focusing on some career path specific training in 
preparation for stages three and four.82 
Stages three and four are from three to five years and five plus years, respectively. 
During these stages, agents receive intensive training and assignments specific to their 
designated career paths and field offices are required to monitor the workforce to ensure a 
minimum of 80 percent of agents are working within their selected path.83 
This process is not entirely dissimilar to the way the military selects officers for 
specific branches within a service. The U.S. Army, for example, requires officers to 
choose their desired “branch” within the service and places the officers in one of these 
branches based upon needs of the Army and the skills and strengths of the individual 
officer. Given the Army has a number of specific career branches which make up the 
overall force, officers are required to attend branch specific training which ensures the 
officer is fully educated prior to being sent out the field for new assignments. 
The bureau and military methods are different in two major ways: 1) The FBI 
depends largely on “on-the-job” training to create a skilled agent workforce as opposed to 
the military which has specific and comprehensive schools for every occupational 
specialty within the many branches of each military service; and 2) the FBI currently has 
no career manager who ensures an individual agent is exposed to management 
opportunities, and if he or she chooses a managerial position, there is no career manager 
to guide the agent supervisor to appropriate positions throughout his or her career. 
Within the military, the services detail officers to serve as “branch or assignment 
managers” whose sole job is to track specific officers and ensure they are receiving the 
training and assignments which fit the skills and needs of the service and give each 
officer the best opportunity to compete for promotion and coveted assignments within 
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their respective branches. This provides officers clearer understanding of the 
opportunities for future assignments and an unbiased view of what jobs will make the 
officer more competitive for specific military commands. 
The analytical workforce has a somewhat different career path plan and as 
opposed to numerical stages, the analyst goes through early, intermediate, and advanced 
stages of training throughout his or her career. These training sessions, held at the FBI 
Academy in Quantico, must remain aligned with the guidance used by the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), FBI analysts must develop the following 
competencies: 
• Critical thinking 
• Communications 
• Engagement and integration 
• Accountability for results 
• Personal Integrity and leadership84 
In much the same way as FBI special agents, analysts are required to serve in a 
variety of positions to round out the skill set needed to be successful.  The buildup of the 
analyst workforce has outpaced the FBI’s ability to provide initial and advanced training 
needed, but the Directorate of Intelligence, which serves as the parent organization for all 
analysts within the FBI, is currently creating and modifying both the educational and 
assignment requirements for the analysts to capitalize on this highly educated segment of 
the FBI workforce.85 
H. CONCLUSIONS 
The FBI is making real progress in fulfilling its mandate of serving the United 
States as both a domestic intelligence agency and as the country’s premier federal law 
                                                 





enforcement agency. This progress is not without setbacks, and it will take additional 
time and money to invest in training and hiring personnel, creating the systems needed to 
produce a predictive intelligence picture, and refining both the personnel and systems to 
adapt to new threats and to embrace new adaptations of the systems to address all 
programs.   
Systems built to assist the FBI in the national security arena are proving to be 
effective in detecting and preventing other criminal activity.  The FBI should endeavor to 
create systems and platforms that are suitable to conduct multiple capacity missions, 
thereby increasing their functionality and thereby limiting the amount of system specific 
training necessary for users. 
Through the implementation of the SET process, the adaptation of certain aspects 
of military processes to create positive transformative effects, and establishing systems 
and a workforce which is efficient, educated, and skilled to encounter the threats of 




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. EMBRACING CHANGE AND PRESERVING CULTURE  
Governmental institutions endure the tumult of history for a number of reasons, 
not the least of which are relevancy, maintaining public trust, providing a unique service 
that cannot be replicated, and the ability to adapt to changing times. The FBI has been 
thrust into a new era of change brought about by the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001. 
More than seven years have passed since the events of that day, but the vulnerabilities 
exposed by those 19 hijackers and their support network abroad continue to produce 
change within the FBI and the entire framework of the United States intelligence 
community.  
1. Relevance 
The FBI maintains relevancy as an organization in two ways. First, it receives its 
broad authority from Presidential directives and statutory sources within the U.S. Code to 
investigate approximately 300 violations of federal law ensuring the agency retains a 
critically important role as the primary investigative arm of the federal government. 
Second, the FBI executes its responsibilities with professionalism and success in both 
national security and criminal investigations. The Attorney General Guidelines for FBI 
domestic operations clarifies the bureau’s role as the primary investigative arms of the 
federal government: 
As the primary investigative agency of the federal government, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the authority and responsibility 
to investigate all violations of federal law that are not exclusively assigned 
to another federal agency. The FBI is further vested by law and by 
Presidential directives with the primary role in carrying out investigations 
within the United States of threats to the national security. This includes 
the lead domestic role in investigating international terrorist threats to the 
United States, and in conducting counterintelligence activities to meet 
foreign entities' espionage and intelligence efforts directed against the 




collecting foreign intelligence as a member agency of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community. The FBI accordingly plays crucial roles in the enforcement of 
federal law and the proper administration of justice in the United States, in 
the protection of the national security, and in obtaining information 
needed by the United States for the conduct of its foreign affairs. These 
roles reflect the wide range of the FBI's current responsibilities and 
obligations, which require the FBI to be both an agency that effectively 
detects, investigates, and prevents crimes, and an agency that effectively 
protects the national security and collects intelligence.86 
As long as the FBI maintains the trust of the policymakers as an independent, 
honest, and professional agency, as well as maintaining the trust of the people for whom 
it serves, it will remain an organization deeply woven into the fabric of American life and 
the preservation of it. The FBI will encounter difficulties; however, if it is unable to 
incorporate the intelligence processes outlined by the SET initiative or if it fails to 
produce a capable predictive intelligence capacity. 
2. Maintaining the Public Trust 
There are certain occupations in American life that draw interest from the public, 
and serving as an FBI agent is one of those occupations. Fortunately, the workforce at the 
FBI was stricken with the same curiosity. Employees at the FBI tell strikingly similar 
stories about childhood dreams of being a special agent and many have shaped their 
entire lives to meet the rigid requirements of the bureau. The desire and ability to meet 
these requirements instills a sense of pride in the organization and esprit de corps among 
colleagues. This desire to serve is what shapes the way the bureau serves—honestly, 
humbly, and passionately. These ideals create an organization that is inherently conscious 
of its responsibility to serve the public, not coerce it. This makes the FBI precisely the 
right institution to execute the domestic intelligence function of the United States.   
Some observers believe the FBI is ill-suited to function as the nation’s domestic 
intelligence agency because of its dual role as a law enforcement agency. This premise is 
false for several reasons.  First, an agency that understands the rule of law and can apply 
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it to its investigations is precisely the right agency to implement the authorities necessary 
to collect intelligence legitimately and legally and to protect the public and prevent 
criminal and terrorist acts. Conversely, an agency that has no concept of legal process or 
one that needs no predication to conduct intelligence gathering operations is much more 
likely to “over-collect” and abuse authorities than one that adheres to a long-standing 
tradition of operating within a legal framework such as the Attorney General Guidelines 
for domestic intelligence. 
Public trust in the FBI to investigate significant violent crime, prevent terror, and 
protect them from corrupt corporate and public leaders is based on the FBI’s adherence to 
the Constitution and the authorities granted to it. The Attorney General Guidelines states:  
All activities under these Guidelines must have a valid purpose consistent 
with these Guidelines, and must be carried out in conformity with the 
Constitution and all applicable statutes, executive orders, Department of 
Justice regulations and policies, and Attorney General guidelines. These 
Guidelines do not authorize investigating or collecting or maintaining 
information on United States persons solely for the purpose of monitoring 
activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other 
rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. These 
Guidelines also do not authorize any conduct prohibited by the Guidance 
Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies.87 
The FBI maintains a set of core values set forth first by Director Freeh and 
reinforced by Director Mueller that stresses the agency’s concern for protecting the civil 
and legal rights of the American public. Those core values are: 
• Rigorous obedience to the Constitution of the United States; 
• Respect for the dignity of all those we protect; 
• Compassion; 
• Fairness; 
• Uncompromising personal integrity and institutional integrity; 
                                                 




• Accountability by accepting responsibility for our actions and decisions 
and the consequences of our actions and decisions; and 
• Leadership, both personal and professional.88 
3. Providing a Unique Service 
In a message written in a recent journal published to commemorate the FBI’s 100 
years of service to the nation, Director Mueller encapsulated in a paragraph, and speaks 
directly to what makes the FBI such a unique institution: 
One hundred years ago, a new federal investigative force, the Bureau of 
Investigation, was created under the Department of Justice to protect 
America against federal crimes and to ensure justice for all citizens.  In 
1935, the agency became known as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  
From its earliest days, the FBI successfully confronted crime, corruption 
and terrorism.  The Bureau’s reputation grew and the dedicated men and 
women serving within its ranks gained recognition as skilled and 
consummate professionals.  Today, the FBI is among the world’s few 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies that combine both of those 
disciplines within one organization.  All of us in the FBI are proud to be a 
part of this enduring legacy.89  
Similarly, the Attorney General provides the following statement regarding FBI 
authorities and responsibilities: “The FBI is an intelligence agency, as well as a law 
enforcement agency. Its basic functions accordingly extend beyond limited investigations 
of discrete matters, and include broader analytic and planning functions.”90  There is no 
other agency within the United States government that is capable to perform the wide 
array of special duties and investigative authorities required to keep America safe from 
the threats facing it.  To maintain this trust, the FBI must continue to balance the needs of 
creating a predictive intelligence capacity, while safeguarding the individual rights of the 
citizens it has sworn to protect. 
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4. Adapting to Change 
This thesis described the transformative changes ongoing within the FBI to 
protect the United States and its interests abroad from a myriad of multi-spectrum threats.  
Despite arguments that suggest the FBI is taking too long to transform or is incapable of 
doing so, the FBI has proven its resiliency resilient throughout its 100 year history and 
has proven it can adapt itself to meet the challenges of the day.  The following is a short 
list of major changes that forced the FBI to refocus investigative resources or take on new 
responsibilities: 
• Early interstate criminal activity (circa 1908) 
• Espionage Act / Anarchists / Violent labor protests (circa 1914) 
• Kidnapers / Auto theft (circa 1919)  
• Comprehensive Identification Facility (circa 1924)  
• Interstate crime / Bank Robbery / Gangs / Kidnapping (circa 1930) 
• Spies and saboteurs (WWII) (circa 1936) 
• Espionage (circa 1947) 
• Organized crime / Public corruption (circa 1970) 
• Domestic security activities (circa 1976)  
• Gang violence / Drugs (circa 1982) 
• Terrorism (circa 1987) 
• Significant corporate fraud (1990s) 
• Terrorism / Domestic intelligence refocus (2001)91 
The FBI as an organization is capable of changing to meet current challenges.  
What makes change difficult, however, is that with each new assumption of responsibility 
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can require more personnel, more dynamic systems, or more education to ensure the 
agency keeps apace of the growing requirements to keep America safe. To accomplish 
this process of adaptation, Director Mueller recognized early in his tenure what was 
needed:    
Since becoming Director, I have been able to observe firsthand the volatile 
environment in which the FBI is called to operate. I have become 
increasingly convinced that success in the post-9/11 environment depends 
upon the FBI becoming more flexible, agile, and mobile in its capacity to 
respond to the array of difficult and challenging national security and 
criminal threats facing the United States. The FBI must become better at 
shaping its workforce, collaborating with its partners, applying technology 
to support investigations, operations, and analyses protecting our 
information, and developing core competencies.92 
Although the FBI faces the same rigidity found in any bureaucracy, the talent and 
dedication of the investigative workforce makes it possible for the agency to adapt to 
defeat the new threats facing the country. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To transform the FBI not only to meet the challenges of terrorism and other non-
linear threats of the next century, but also to make these transformational changes 
adaptable to the entire bureau, the FBI must build legacy systems that support this period 
of change.  The following recommendations can help this process of transformation.    
1. Establish Doctrine 
The FBI should begin creating a comprehensive library of doctrinal information 
for the terrorist groups and criminal enterprises it faces. The U.S. intelligence community 




                                                 





techniques, tactics, and procedures they use to conduct their operations. The FBI can use 
this information to establish doctrine for each group which they can then use to train 
agents and analysts.   
In much the same way the military uses enemy doctrine to train its intelligence 
officers and analysts to determine enemy courses of action, so too can the FBI produce 
doctrine to provide agents a baseline of understanding about how specific terrorist 
organizations form, raise funds, train, travel, maintain anonymity, and conduct direct 
actions. Simply asking the field offices to conduct proactive intelligence gathering 
operations to thwart terrorism is insufficient without an adequate understanding of how 
the groups these agents and analysts face actually function. 
2. Create an Advanced Investigative Training Program and a Center for 
Agency Lessons Learned 
If the FBI is to retain its leadership role in federal law enforcement and establish a 
predictive domestic intelligence capability, then it must dedicate itself to a long-term 
educational program for the agent and analyst workforce. For too long, the FBI has 
depended too much on the pre-existing skills of its newly hired agent and analyst 
workforce. With an average hiring age of approximately 30 years, agents have been 
expected to enter the service with enough education and life skills to adequately serve the 
needs of the bureau regardless of which investigative program the agent is assigned. 
While this is a credit to the talent which the bureau attracts, the agency does its 
employees a disservice by not providing similar specific advanced “institutional” or 
“school house” training used by its military colleagues. 
As the bureau is placing more emphasis on joint assignments with other services 
and providing increased opportunities for advanced civil and military schooling, the FBI 
must retool its organic educational and training programs at the FBI Academy in 
Quantico, Virginia to provide investigative specific training such as the utilization of 
doctrine as discussed in Recommendation One, above. For many years, FBI training has 




the United States with little thought to the timing and methodology involved.  By 
recreating mission-specific and mandatory educational forums at the FBI Academy or 
some other suitable venue, the FBI can better govern the content, timing, and reach of its 
educational efforts. 
To take another lead from the United States Army, the FBI also should create a 
center for agency lessons learned, similar to the U.S. Army’s Center for Army Lessons 
Learned (CALL). This center would provide reports, publications of completed 
investigations, and doctrinal updates to the FBI Academy for incorporation into the 
advanced training syllabi for the investigative workforce. This center would act as a 
feeder to the FBI Academy to ensure the instructors are always up to date with 
groundbreaking investigative strategies, the investigative application of new or amended 
authorities by special agents, and updated information concerning the tactics used by 
terrorist groups and criminal organizations.  
3. Create a Leadership Development Program 
Leading an agency as large and diverse as the FBI through the transformational 
process will require capable and visionary leaders. One of the ways to do this is to create 
a leadership development program suitable for shaping the future of the FBI for the next 
century.  As with Recommendation Two above, this program should combine the 
opportunities of joint service schooling, advanced civil schooling, but most importantly, 
organic leadership education at the FBI Academy.   
As with the demonstrated need for career path monitoring, leaders also should be 
required to meet certain educational gates at significant leadership points throughout their 
careers. The FBI should allocate monies to build a new wing at the FBI Academy 
specifically tailored to accommodate leadership education for FBI supervisory personnel.  
Significant educational gates should be accomplished at the entry Supervisory 
Special Agent (SSA/GS-14) rank, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC/GS-15) 
rank, and the Special Agent in Charge (SAC/SES) rank to ensure future leaders are 




field office. While the bureau is fortunate to have an educated and motivated workforce, 
some responsibilities related to supervisory positions are not taught prior to the agent 
being placed into that position. Most tasks have little to do with the investigative or 
leadership aspects of the job rather they are highly administrative and peculiarly bureau-
specific tasks which should be learned prior to assuming the supervisory role. This sort of 
training is critical to ensure future leaders can make an immediate impact upon arrival 
into a leadership position. 
4. “Fuse” Field Intelligence Groups and Fusion Centers 
As the nation draws further away from September 11, 2001, the federal 
government may soon look to reduce the costs associated with the continued funding of 
fusion centers. The federal government has had little say about how many fusion centers 
should exist within a given state. This has led to the creation of “competing fusion 
centers” in some states.93  
Fusion center funding will look progressively more attractive to reduce, or even 
cut altogether, unless fusion centers begin producing intelligence products that are 
relevant to their consumers who have been unimpressed with the frequency and relevance 
of fusion center and federal government products as a whole.94 A GAO report in 
published in November 2007, for instance, found that only two of the 43 then operational 
fusion centers are solely dedicated to terrorism. The vast majority of fusion centers are 
focused on street crime or natural hazards such as hurricanes.95 
If federal assistance is withdrawn from fusion centers it is unlikely that states and 
local governments would be able or willing to pay for the full costs associated with 
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operating them and what could have been an instrumental platform for information 
sharing would cease to exist. A potential solution to the total dissolution of fusion 
centers, however, is to combine them with the FBI’s Field Intelligence Groups (FIG) in a 
manner similar to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). While the JTTF functions in 
an investigative capacity, the FIG/fusion centers would do so in an analytical way, taking 
the information and intelligence collected from national level/intelligence community 
reporting, JTTF investigations, and state and local law enforcement operations and using 
these sources to create a more complete intelligence picture for the consumer.   
Currently, many fusion centers have little to no access to actual investigations 
being conducted by the FBI’s JTTF operating in their area. This is due to classification 
and “need to know” restrictions and often laws that prohibit the sharing of certain U.S. 
person information with non-law enforcement personnel. It seems unrealistic for fusion 
centers to “fuse” intelligence when they do not have access to what is usually the only 
body of investigators which actually produces terrorism-related information. 
In January 2008, John Rollins of the Congressional Research Office wrote a 
report for congress regarding the issues and options for fusions centers. One of the 
suggested options set forth by Rollins was the expansion of the FBI Field Intelligence 
Groups to assume the full analytical function for the federal government and moving the 
fusion center “all hazards” mission to FEMA. Rollins wrote: 
Expand the FBI FIGs to be the Federal Strategic Analysis Fusion Centers. 
Although provocative and radical, fusion center critics might argue that 
fusion centers are superfluous insofar as the primary federal benefit they 
seek to provide is prevention of manmade (terrorist) attacks (a traditional 
federal agency role) and/or destabilizing crime (gangs, narcotics, etc. — 
both a federal and SLT responsibility). Those who subscribe to this school 
might argue that state and regional fusion centers could be eliminated and 
federal agencies take over all the functions those centers once performed, 
with intelligence and counterterrorism related work going to the FBI, and 
the all-hazards functions adopted by some fusion centers turned over to 
FEMA or the state/local agencies that traditionally handle natural 
disasters. The counter to this argument is that a changed threat 
environment requires non-traditional thinking — designed to prevent and 





substantial natural disasters. Nevertheless, the argument that fusion centers 
may represent an organizational solution to a functional information 
sharing and analysis problem can still be made.96 
As part of this combined mission, analysts assigned to the fusion centers could 
“strip” identifying subject and target information from ongoing investigations and 
provide the pertinent attack methodologies to state, local, and tribal law enforcement 
authorities. This information is actually useful to the officer working the street. During a 
hearing before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism 
Risk Assessment, Sheriff Leroy D. Baca of Los Angeles County said the federal 
government keeps relevant information from the cop on the street, resulting in a lack of 
situational awareness.97 
To address this shortcoming, the FIG/fusion center merger could provide this 
“precursor” information by combining the results of FBI investigations to the street cop 
using the connectivity of the state and local fusion centers. This type of dissemination is 
happening now in only an ad hoc fashion and typically in areas where there is a close 
working relationship between the FBI and fusion center.  
By overcoming the bureaucratic obstacles to create this Joint Analytical Task 
Force, federal, state, local, and tribal intelligence consumers can have access to relevant 
and timely intelligence products that span the entire spectrum of crime problems 
currently facing the United States. Agents and analysts across all levels of government 
could collaborate analytically the same way agents, analysts, and task force officers do so 
with investigations in the JTTF’s. With FBI oversight, these JTAF’s would use a 
common framework, guidelines, and dissemination standards which continues to elude 
the various local, county, and state fusion centers throughout the nation. 
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C. “NEVER DONE TRANSFORMING” 
The FBI is an organization uniquely suited to accomplish the roles as both a 
domestic intelligence agency and a law enforcement organization.  This is not simply 
because the FBI is transforming itself to do so, but also because terrorism, criminal acts, 
and intelligence are interwoven so deeply that separating them would be to ignore every 
hard won lesson since 9/11. The FBI has a dual role as both a law enforcement 
organization and an intelligence agency. To separate these functions would be to embrace 
an idea that law enforcement powers are not necessary in the pursuit of domestic 
intelligence investigations and would seriously erode the nation’s ability to use all legal 
investigative techniques to counter those who are willing to exploit any weakness in 
America’s defenses. The FBI has proven its ability to transform to meet the law 
enforcement and domestic intelligence needs of the United States throughout its 
huindred-year history. In this last century, the FBI has given the American people every 
reason to support and believe it can again transform itself to meet this new challenge and 
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